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Problems and Recommendations
Strengthening the Core o r Splitting Europe? 
Prospects and Pitfalls o f a Strategy of  
Differentiated Integration
“United in Diversity” is the motto o f the European 
Union (EU). Indeed, the diversity in the EU has risen 
to a level requiring an ever wider array o f special 
arrangements for individual Member States. In many 
areas o f EU policy making, including the common 
currency, justice and home affairs, the Fiscal Com­
pact, the banking union, and the EU Patent, agree­
ments could only be reached between Member States 
i f  smaller coalitions o f them moved forward while 
others remained outside. During the recent European 
debt crisis, this differentiation reached a new scope 
that will permanently change the governance, balance 
o f power, and cohesion of the EU. For this, EU Member 
States used a wide range of instruments for differenti­
ated integration: enhanced cooperation under the EU 
Treaty, intergovernmental coordination with or with­
out the use o f EU structures, and cooperation outside 
the EU based on international law. Some Member 
States also made use o f negative differentiation by 
insisting on the opt-out rights enshrined in the EU 
Treaty in specific policy areas. The idea o f a “m ulti­
speed Europe” has therefore been a reality for some 
time.
Differentiated forms of cooperation were originally 
intended only as a strategy o f “last resort” for Euro­
pean integration. Yet in an EU that will soon grow to 
28 Member States, its use has expanded considerably. 
On the level o f primary law, the Treaty o f Lisbon estab­
lished several new opt-outs, including a protocol par­
tially excepting the United Kingdom and Poland from 
the Charter o f Fundamental Rights. The formal instru­
m ent o f enhanced cooperation was expanded in scope, 
and special new forms of flexible cooperation were 
introduced both in the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) and in justice and home affairs. W ith 
the Euro Plus Pact, the Fiscal Compact, the use o f en­
hanced cooperation in trans-European divorce law, 
and the introduction of the new EU patent, differen­
tiation now extends into core areas o f EU integration.
This increasing differentiation presents an enor­
mous challenge to the further development o f the EU. 
As the Member States are moving to deepen the Eco­
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) by the primary 
means o f differentiated integration (DI), it is impera-
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tive to analyse the positive and negative effects o f this 
approach in the contexts o f Schengen, the introduc­
tion of the euro, and the recent use cases o f enhanced 
cooperation. Here, the analysis shows, first, that the 
EU has been able to minimise the potential negative 
effects o f DI so far. The feared splitting of Europe has 
been prevented through the use o f informal forums, 
an inclusive personnel policy and most im portantly 
through the involvement o f “DI outsiders”—that is, 
non-participants in specific DI projects—as observers 
in decision-making processes. Second, differentiation 
has proven to be an effective means o f overcoming 
political impasses. Nevertheless, with the exception 
of the European Social Charter, no DI project to date 
has succeeded in bringing all o f the EU Member States 
together again. Third, the analysis clearly reveals that 
the measures introduced during the European debt 
crisis have brought differentiated integration to a new 
level—one that requires a new strategy for the future 
development o f the EU.
Both the Member States that are embarking on a 
deepening of the EMU and those that have decided to 
rem ain outside for the time being should therefore 
critically examine the consequences o f differentiated 
integration and identify possible strategies for its con­
tinued use. The debate should start with the under­
standing that differentiated integration is the only 
means o f achieving the deeper integration proposed 
to overcome the European debt crisis. However, this 
instrum ent should be used carefully and purposefully. 
To do so, in particular Germany as one o f the main 
drivers o f Eurozone reform should work together with 
its partners both within and outside the common cur­
rency zone to design differentiation in a way that 
empowers the EMU countries to move forward, retains 
the possibility for pre-ins to jo in  at a later day, and 
safeguards the integrity o f the EU as a whole. In 
addition, the aim o f the UK to add new opt-outs will 
further intensify the momentum towards increased 
differentiation in the EU. If these developments are 
not embedded in an overall strategy for the develop­
m ent o f the EU, the increasing differentiation will 
risk unravelling the foundations o f the Union.
In the future, three guidelines should therefore be 
followed when using the instrum ent o f differentiated 
integration. First, current and future DI initiatives 
should guarantee permeability. That is, even non-par­
ticipating Member States should be informed and 
involved through EU institutions. This would m ini­
mise the potential for impasses within the EU-27 and 
ensure the opportunity for non-participants to jo in  at
a later date. Second, the pro-integration Member 
States should agree to the limitation o f using DI in­
struments only w ithin the EU framework. While 
mechanisms such as enhanced cooperation or Treaty 
opt-outs may be less flexible than intergovernmental 
agreements outside of EU law, they nonetheless make 
it possible to fully involve EU institutions. This would 
safeguard not only the integrity o f the EU as a whole, 
but its core achievements, such as the single market 
and the cooperation in foreign policy. DI instruments 
w ithin EU law also ensure greater transparency and 
involve fewer risks to democratic legitimacy. Third, 
but not least in importance, a strategy o f consolidation 
is required to bring the various forms of differentiated 
integration back together. As past experience has 
shown, the planned incorporation of the Fiscal Com­
pact into the EU treaties will only succeed i f  carried 
out in conjunction with more comprehensive changes 
to EU primary law as well as far-reaching compromises 
with countries outside the euro area. Providing that 
these three conditions are fulfilled, differentiated inte­
gration will allow the necessary integration steps to 
be taken within a core o f Member States to deepen the 
EMU without causing the EU as a whole to unravel or 
split.
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Forms of differentiated integration
Differentiation as a reality in the integration process
Differentiated integration is changing the political 
dynamics and processes o f the European Union. These 
changes, and the associated fears o f a “split Europe,” 
are a constant factor in the debates that have been 
underway since the Eurozone debt crisis began.
Key policy decisions on financial assistance to debt- 
stricken countries but also on sweeping reforms of 
economic governance in the EU have been made—or 
at least agreed politically in advance—by the Euro-17.1 
Even non-Eurozone Member States voluntarily con­
tributed to portions o f the financial assistance pro­
grams and to the Euro Plus and the Fiscal Compact, 
not least to counter the risk o f a “division o f the EU 
into countries inside the Eurozone and countries 
outside” (Polish Prime Minister Tusk).2 The EU is thus 
splitting into three distinct groups: the 17 Eurozone 
countries, countries such as Poland that are legally 
obligated and politically committed to jo in  (‘pre-ins’) 
and permanent outsiders such as the United Kingdom.
The debate about the pros and cons o f a multi-speed 
Europe that has been ongoing since the 1970s is thus 
obsolete—differentiated integration has long since 
become a reality o f the integration process. In the 
face o f the heterogeneous interests o f a soon-to-be 
28-member EU, which will make it difficult to enact 
further EU treaty reforms in the medium term, it is 
now clear that differentiation will be the primary 
method of European integration going forward. W hat 
consequences does differentiated integration have, 
particularly for the balance of power between indi­
vidual Member States and EU institutions? And how 
should differentiated integration be designed to keep 
the negative impacts on the EU to a minim um  for 
both the insiders and the outsiders?
Forms of differentiated integration
The debate around differentiated integration in the 
EU is marked by a certain conceptual ambiguity. There 
is an “excess o f terminology,”3 ranging from a “two- or 
multi-speed Europe,” a “Europe of concentric circles, a 
“core Europe,” and a “Europe a la carte” all the way to 
the Treaty instruments o f “enhanced cooperation” and 
“permanent structured cooperation.” Although often 
used synonymously, these terms imply different forms 
of integration, with politically very different conse­
quences for the EU and its Member States.
The common elem ent running throughout all 
variants o f DI is their deviation from the principle of 
a uniform integration of all Member States in a single 
political entity. By definition, differentiated integra­
tion stands in direct contrast to the vision of an “ever 
closer union” (Article 1 TEU) and to the principle of 
supremacy o f European law. This principle manifests 
itself not only in a series o f judgments handed down 
by the European Court o f Justice, in which the judges 
have continuously emphasised the fundamental im­
portance of EU law and the “need to m aintain its uni­
form validity and application in all Member States.”4 
Pursuant to the principle o f sincere cooperation 
(Article 4(3) TEU), the Treaty on European Union also 
obliges Member States to assist each other in full 
m utual respect. Differentiated integration can thus 
be defined as the state in which the uniformity and 
simultaneity o f integration of all Member States is 
more or less restricted by temporary or permanent 
exceptions.5
The various forms of differentiated integration are 
usually divided into three categories—time, space, and
1 This includes decisions on the structure of the European 
Financial Stability Facility (March 2010), the creation of 
the Euro Plus Pact (March 2011), the second Greece bailout 
package (July 2011), and the Fiscal Compact (March 2012).
2 “Vor dem EU-Gipfel: ‘Deutschland diktiert niemandem
etwas,’” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 16, 2010.
3 Alexander Stubb, “ A Categorization of Differentiated 
Integration,” Journal o f Common Market Studies 34, no. 2 (1996): 
283-95.
4 Daniel Thym, “Supranationale Ungleichzeitigkeit im Recht 
der europäischen Integration,” Europarecht 41, no. 5 (2006): 
637-55.
5 Tobias Bender, “Die Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit nach 
Nizza. Anwendungsfelder und Bewertung im Spiegel histo­
rischer Präzedenzfälle der differenzierten Integration,” Zeit­
schrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 61, no. 4 
(2001): 729-70 (733).
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Differentiation as a reality in the integration process
m atter.6 The concept o f a multi-speed Europe relates to 
a purely temporal variance in the level o f EU states’ 
participation in integration, which nevertheless share 
the same goal. The most commonly found examples of 
temporally limited DI are the transitional provisions 
governing the accession of new Member States. These 
were applied, for instance, during the m ajor enlarge­
m ent in 2004/2007.7 Other examples o f temporally 
differentiated integration include those projects in 
which participation in an integration project is tied 
to the fulfilm ent o f qualitative criteria. For example, 
all o f the countries that acceded in 2004 and 2007 are 
contractually bound to adopt the euro as their cur­
rency. However, to do so, they must first m eet the 
Maastricht criteria, such that to date only five o f the 
twelve states have joined the Eurozone. As this 
example illustrates, the model o f a multi-speed Europe 
is structured around the long-term goal o f uniform, 
supranational integration.
The concept o f variable geometry, or a “Europe of con­
centric circles,” on the other hand, is premised on a 
spatially permanent differentiation. According to this 
model, the goal o f unified integration is abandoned in 
some or all areas, while only smaller groups o f Mem­
ber States move forward together in specific policy 
fields. This core group is then surrounded by an outer 
circle o f less-integrated countries that do not wish to 
participate in certain policy areas for the foreseeable 
future. One illustration o f variable geometry can be 
seen in the opt-outs established in protocols o f the EU 
treaties, for instance, the Danish non-participation in 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). A 
special form of variable geometry is a “core Europe,” 
in which one single group of states would become 
more closely integrated across several policy areas.
Furthest away from unified integration is the con­
cept o f a Europe a la carte, in which the Member States
6 This categorisation, introduced by Alexander Stubb in 
1996, is not absolutely clear-cut. This is especially evident in 
the distinction between categories of space and matter. More 
recent studies, therefore, divide DI projects, into up to six 
dimensions with more than ten characteristics. For the pur­
poses of political debate, however, Stubb’s classification 
remains the most manageable. An overview of the different 
classification schemes can be found in Katharina Holzinger 
and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Differentiated Integration in 
the European Union: Many Concepts, Sparse Theory, Few 
Data,” Journal o f European Public Policy 19, no. 2 (2012): 292-305.
7 An overview of all the transitional periods of the 2004 
treaties of accession is provided in: Ubergangsfristen im EU-Bei- 
trittsvertrag, Info-Brief 32/03. Wissenschaftliche Dienste des 
Deutschen Bundestags (Berlin, 2003).
can, depending on their ability and above all on their 
political will and interests, decide whether to partici­
pate in broad policy areas or even whether to par­
ticipate only in specific measures on a case-by-case 
basis. This most extreme form of differentiated inte­
gration is therefore not characterised by any stable, 
integrated core. Instead, Member States only share a 
small number of basic political objectives such as the 
internal market, while they work together in fluc­
tuating configurations in the large m ajority o f policy 
areas.
The concepts o f a multi-speed Europe and a Europe a la 
carte thus form opposite poles in the broad spectrum 
of DI. Although both share the fundamental element 
o f differentiation, they differ significantly in their 
potential effects on European governance. While the 
purely temporal differentiation o f a multi-speed 
Europe is aimed at strengthening integration through 
the establishment o f an avant-garde group, a Europe a 
la carte implies an EU that is defined by intergovern­
m ental agreements, offering only a weak common 
superstructure for the Member States. In this network­
type system, the key players are the states themselves, 
which m aintain control over their individual treaties 
and are able to determine which substantive issues 
they will participate in, based on their capabilities and 
political interests.
The legal foundations and their effects on 
differentiated integration
EU Member States have a variety o f instrum ents at 
their disposal for designing and adapting projects of 
differentiated integration. The most institutionally 
and politically im portant distinction is whether DI 
is used within or outside of the EU treaties. In the 
former case, the EU structures can be fully used, but 
the treaties also set clear legal limitations. The main 
instrum ent for differentiated integration enshrined 
in the EU treaties is the mechanism of enhanced coop­
eration. This instrum ent is subject to specific condi­
tions and regulations for use. These parameters orient 
the instrum ent o f enhanced cooperation toward 
the model o f a multi-speed Europe with the aim of 
strengthening supranational integration. Hence, 
enhanced cooperation should serve “to further the 
objectives o f the Union, protect its interests, and 
reinforce its integration process” (Article 20(1) TEU).
The scope o f enhanced cooperation has very specific 
limitations. It is permitted only w ithin the shared
SWP Berlin
Prospects and Pitfalls of a 
Strategy of Differentiated Integration 
March 2013
8
The legal foundations and their effects on differentiated integration
competences o f the EU—thus excluding exclusive com­
petences8—with special arrangements that apply to 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
CSDP (Article 329 TFEU).9 Enhanced cooperation 
can thus be used neither to expand EU powers nor 
to reduce them  by returning competences to the 
national level.10 An additional guideline protects the 
core area o f integration, declaring that enhanced 
cooperation may not undermine the internal market 
or the economic, social, or territorial cohesion of the 
EU, and may not lead to bias or discrim ination in 
trade and competition between Member States.
In line with its goal o f promoting maximum inte­
gration, enhanced cooperation requires that the 
supranational institutions participate in the initiative 
and the decision-making procedures o f enhanced co­
operation. It is designed to be used only as a “last 
resort” (Article 20(2) TEU) when the Union as a whole 
cannot agree on the desired objectives within a reason­
able period of time and when at least nine Member 
States are willing to take part in such cooperation. The 
actual proposal for enhanced cooperation must come 
from the Commission, and it must be approved by the 
European Parliament as well as a qualified m ajority 
o f the Council.11 Thus, whereas the non-participating
8 The areas of exclusive competence are defined in Article 3 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and in­
clude customs union, competition rules for the internal 
market, monetary policy for the euro states, parts of the com­
mon fisheries policy, common commercial policy, and inter­
national agreements that relate to EU competences.
9 The complete opening of enhanced cooperation into all 
areas ofEU competence, including security and defense 
policy, is one of the crucial changes in this instrument intro­
duced by the Lisbon Treaty. In the CFSP, however, unanimity 
in the Council is necessary to approve enhanced cooperation, 
while the European Parliament and the Commission are 
largely excluded (Article 329 TFEU).
10 Article 333 TFEU contains an important additional option 
that was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. This makes it 
possible, with a unanimous decision of the participants in an 
enhanced cooperation project, to change decision-making to 
the ordinary legislative procedure. In this procedure, deci­
sions are adopted by a qualified majority in the Council with 
codecision by the European Parliament.
11 In addition, there are a series of special clauses specifying 
conditions for the use of this instrument in the area of justice 
and home affairs, according to which enhanced cooperation 
is established semi-automatically. Such “semi-automatic” 
enhanced cooperation occurs if a legislative procedure in spe­
cific policy areas of justice and home affairs is brought to a 
halt at the request of a Member State and is referred to the 
European Council. If the heads of state and government do 
not reach agreement at the highest level, the enhanced co-
states have no veto right, the European Parliament 
remains fully involved. The emphasis on strengthen­
ing European integration is further evident in the 
decision-making processes in enhanced cooperation, 
which involve non-participating states as well. All EU 
countries are allowed to participate in the delibera­
tions o f the Council as observers, but only DI partici­
pants have the right to vote, while Parliament, the 
Commission, and the Court o f Justice perform their 
normal functions in the respective policy areas. These 
rules are intended to ensure a high degree o f perme­
ability in the enhanced cooperation. Moreover, as long 
as specified criteria are met, subsequent participation 
is allowed at any time. The permanent exclusion of a 
Member State from enhanced cooperation is not per­
missible.
A special form of DI exclusively for the CSDP is 
permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). There are im ­
portant differences between perm anent structured 
cooperation and enhanced cooperation, which re­
semble each other only on a semantic level. Perma­
nent structured cooperation is concentrated on devel­
oping m ilitary capabilities, while decisions about 
CSDP operations rem ain subject to all EU countries. 
PESCO is more closely aligned to the model o f a Europe 
a la carte. Thus, it allows even smaller groups o f Mem­
ber States to establish PESCO, but at the same time 
also ensures that individual Member States can with­
draw—or even be excluded—at any time (Article 46 
TEU). In contrast to enhanced cooperation, PESCO may 
be initiated in the CFSP with a qualified majority. In 
this process, the High Representative and the Euro­
pean Defence Agency are assigned coordinating func­
tions linking the PESCO to the EU framework. PESCO 
was conceived primarily to establish a core group in 
the defence sector that is willing to m eet particularly 
demanding requirements in developing m ilitary capa­
bilities and to work together very closely in this criti­
cal area o f national sovereignty. The participating 
states must meet rigorous quality criteria, which first 
need be defined in the Council’s decision to establish 
the PESCO. However, so far no group of Member 
States agreed to closer cooperation on defence, and in 
the three years since the entry into force o f the Lisbon
operation of Member States that do want to participate is 
considered automatically approved. Jorg Monar, “The ‘Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice’: ‘Schengen’ Europe, Opt 
Ins, Opt Outs and Associates,” in Which Europe? The Politics o f 
Differentiated Integration, ed. Kenneth Dyson and Angelos Sepos 
(Basingstoke, 2010), 279-92.
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Treaty, permanent structured cooperation has yet to 
be used.12
Finally, differentiated integration within the exist­
ing EU structures can also be established on the basis 
o f EU treaties and protocols in the form of negative dif­
ferentiation through opt-outs claimed by individual Mem­
ber States. This option was used for the first time in 
the Maastricht Treaty, which the United Kingdom 
approved on the condition that it would rem ain per­
manently outside the monetary union. Similarly, after 
the first negative referendum on the Treaty o f Maas­
tricht, Denmark negotiated opt-outs that enabled the 
country to distance itself from the m ilitary CSDP as 
well as large parts o f justice and home affairs and the 
monetary union.13 W ith the Treaty o f Lisbon, the num­
ber o f opt-outs reserved by individual Member States 
has continued to rise. In the meantime, these opt-outs 
have come to impinge on areas that are essential to 
the fundamental values o f the EU and the develop­
m ent o f a European identity, such as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which has only limited applica­
tion in the United Kingdom and Poland.14 Because 
the opt-outs that are set down in protocols to the EU 
treaties, they can only be established or rescinded 
through treaty change.15 In the past, they have there­
fore been used only as a last resort to enable com­
promise in the course o f major treaty negotiations. 
Because o f the great effort associated with treaty
12 Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, “Permanent Structured 
Cooperation in Defence: Building Effective European Armed 
Forces,” in Integrationsprojekt Sicherheit. Aspekte europäischer 
Sicherheitspolitik im Vertrag von Lissabon, ed. Franco Algieri et 
al. (Baden-Baden, 2011), 101-10.
13 Rudolf Hrbek, “Der Integrationsprozess und das Kon­
zept ‘differenzierte Integration’,” in Europe Reloaded. Differen­
tiation or Fusion?, ed. Udo Diedrichs et al. (Baden-Baden, 2011), 
78-109.
14 According to Protocol 30 of the TEU, none of the rights 
established by the Charter of Fundamental Rights are en­
forceable in Poland or the United Kingdom. The concrete 
implications of this protocol are the subject of legal contro­
versy. See Josef Franz Lindner, “Zur grundsätzlichen Bedeu­
tung des Protokolls über die Anwendung der Grundrechte­
charta auf Polen und das Vereinigte Königreich,” Europarecht 
43, no. 6 (2008): 786-799. It should be noted that the Czech 
Republic also wants to join in this protocol. As the necessary 
treaty amendment via a simplified procedure was recently 
rejected by the European Parliament, the protocol still does 
not cover the Czech Republic at the time of writing.
15 A state can, however, retreat from its opt-outs unilaterally
insofar as provided for in primary law. For example, Den­
mark has the option of giving up its special status in the
Schengen area at any time according to its constitutional
provisions (Article 8, Protocol 22 TEU).
change, opt-outs are not suitable for differentiation 
in regular procedures. The modalities o f the decision­
making process and the involvement o f non-participat­
ing states in such opt-outs are regulated on an indivi­
dual basis in the protocols.16 If  the UK does want to 
repatriate powers from the EU, it will therefore need a 
full-scale treaty change agreed to and ratified by all 27 
EU Member States.
Provisions for opt-outs within the EU framework 
become particularly complex in cases where outsiders 
are also given the right for an opt-in, thus allowing 
them to participate in individual decisions in the 
respective policy areas. An example of this can be seen 
with Protocol 21 o f the TEU, which grants Britain and 
Ireland an opt-out to provisions in the Area o f Free­
dom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ).17 Article 3 o f this 
Protocol, however, allows the two countries, during 
a legislative procedure in the AFSJ, to nevertheless 
decide to participate in the individual measure. In this 
case, they are fully involved in the relevant decision­
making processes.18 These opt-in provisions provide 
non-participating states with a maximum of flexibility 
and therefore correspond to the model o f a Europe a 
la carte. Holders o f an opt-in are not required to be 
involved in the project as a whole, can select which 
financial and political costs they want to take on, and 
choose to act solely in line with their own interests. 
These opt-in opportunities are therefore used on a 
regular basis: Ireland and the United Kingdom have 
participated in the m ajority o f decisions on asylum 
policy and on the fight against illegal migration but 
have largely avoided agreements on visa policy, border 
management policy, and legal m igration.19 Since the 
Treaty o f Lisbon entered into force, Britain has exer­
cised its opt-in rights in 20 o f the 24 Council decisions 
taken in the AFSJ, which constitutes almost full in­
volvement in that area.20
16 Gorm Rye Olsen and Jess Pilegaard, “The Cost of Non- 
Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy,” European Security 14, no. 3 (2005): 339-60.
17 Funda Tekin, Differentiated Integration at Work. The Institu­
tionalisation and Implementation o f Opt-outs from European Inte­
gration in the Area o f Freedom, Security and Justice (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2011).
18 In cases where a negative vote from the UK or Ireland 
blocks approval of an initiative—for example, because it is an 
issue that requires unanimity—the other Member States may 
adopt the initiative after a “reasonable period” even without 
the two states’ approval (Article 3(2) Protocol 21 TEU).
19 Monar, “The ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’”
(see note 11): 281.
20 Own research based on EUR-Lex.
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Apart from the, in many respects, restrictive legal 
foundations for differentiated integration within EU 
structures, there is also the relatively open possibility 
for European countries to cooperate on the basis of 
international law—even in agreements involving non­
EU countries. Such intergovernmental cooperation outside 
the EU framework is neither excluded nor explicitly 
regulated by the EU treaties, and can therefore take 
different forms. EU countries are subject to only three 
restrictions in this respect under European law. First, 
differentiated integration is excluded in areas such as 
trade policy that fall w ithin exclusive competences of 
the EU—competences that the Member States have 
already ceded to the EU. Second, the principle o f soli­
darity and the respect for the objectives o f the EU 
Treaty are imperatives that may not be infringed 
upon. An international agreement that includes a 
Member State may not run counter to the principles 
of the EU. Finally, such agreements, in contrast to 
agreements w ithin the EU legal system, cannot rely 
on the full involvement o f EU institutions. From the 
perspective o f the partner states, this ensures that 
further competences are not transferred to the supra­
national institutions o f the EU. However, it eliminates 
the potential for the Commission and the European 
Court o f Justice to enforce the relevant decisions, and 
removes the additional democratic potential that 
would arise through the full participation of the Euro­
pean Parliament.
W ithin the bounds of these three restrictions, inter­
governmental cooperation outside the EU is used by 
Member States in manifold ways. One of these is to 
foster European integration. The Treaty o f Schengen 
and the Prüm Convention, for example, were created 
outside the EU on the basis o f international law but 
were intended for eventual transposition into EU law 
and application to the entire EU.21 At the other end of 
the spectrum, however, intergovernmental coopera­
tion may also be used to permanently rem ain outside 
the EU framework. One example o f this was the agree­
m ent o f France and the United Kingdom in November 
2010 for closer defence cooperation—an explicitly bi­
lateral project with no ambitions for eventual “Euro­
peanisation.”22
21 This is underscored in the preamble to the Prüm Conven­
tion, where the Parties emphasise their strong desire to trans­
fer these regulations into the legal framework of the Union.
22 Ben Jones, Franco-British Military Cooperation: A New Engine 
for European Defence? (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies,
2011 ).
Differentiated integration is becoming the 
modus operandi of the EU
Thus far, differentiated integration as a whole has 
taken place in three main policy areas—common cur­
rency, justice and home affairs, and Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). Looking at the current uses 
o f differentiated integration by individual Member 
States (see the diagram in the appendix, page 34), four 
parallel dynamics can be identified. First, a core o f 
Member States has emerged, comprised of countries 
that have participated in almost all integration proj­
ects to date. These include the founding states o f the 
EU and most o f the euro-area member states, with 
Germany and France at the group’s centre. However, 
Member States that joined later, such as Estonia, Fin­
land, Malta, and Austria, have also participated in all 
o f the major DI projects. Moreover, several Central and 
Eastern European countries have participated in all 
integration initiatives with the exception of the EMU, 
for which they do not yet m eet the necessary criteria. 
In addition, several o f them are on their way to jo in ­
ing the euro within the next five to ten years. This 
core o f 20 Member States constitutes a m ajority of 
the European Union.
Second, integration “outsiders” do not comprise a 
consistent group, but vary from one policy area to the 
next or even w ithin policy areas. The inconsistent and 
ever-changing picture o f Member States that remain 
outside o f DI projects points to the development o f a 
Europe a la carte, in which the individual countries 
determine their participation individually, based on 
their own policy preferences. The spectrum ranges 
from the United Kingdom, which is an outsider in 
almost all DI projects, with the exception of (limited) 
participation in the CSDP and the EU patent,23 
through Member States like Poland that have only 
withdrawn from participation in a few projects, all 
the way to core members like Spain, which has have 
remained outside only a single DI project (in this 
case, the EU patent) for reasons of particular national 
interest.
Third, up to this point, differentiated integration 
has been used only in exceptional cases—as a last 
resort solution to stalled negotiations or when new 
special conditions had to be negotiated after a failed 
ratification. Differentiation has not been the result 
o f a systematic plan for the development o f a more
23 Only Italy and Spain have decided not to participate in
the EU Patent. On the introduction of the patent, see page 16.
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integrated core. This was apparent, for example, in 
the negotiations about the inclusion o f the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty. The British 
veto on the incorporation of the Charter was funda­
mental in nature and therefore could not be overcome 
by concessions in other policy areas. In order to avoid 
having to abandon the symbolically significant inclu­
sion of the Charter in the treaty, exceptions have been 
granted to the United Kingdom—and later Poland, and 
in the future possibly the Czech Republic as well.24
That the instrum ent o f differentiated integration 
has been employed only as a desperate remedy to over­
come blockages in negotiations and not as a general 
strategy is attributable to a broad coalition of Member 
States that have opposed its systematic use. When 
attempts have been made to promote DI, particularly 
those that have garnered significant media attention 
such as the Schäuble-Lamers paper (1994) or Joschka 
Fischer’s ideas about differentiation in his speech at 
Humboldt University Berlin (2000), they have been 
sharply rejected by smaller Member States and those 
not qualified for participation. For one thing, many 
critics see a risk o f dividing the EU into privileged and 
non-privileged states, into first- and second-class mem­
bers. More specifically, German and French initiatives 
for the expansion of DI have been seen as an expres­
sion of hegemonic aspirations. A Franco-German 
dominated “core Europe,” critics suggest, would result 
in a Union with several categories o f Member States, 
in which states outside the core would be excluded 
and steadily lose influence.25
Although DI has long been a reality—with projects 
such as the euro and the Schengen Area launched 
during the integration process—it has never prevailed 
as a general strategy for European integration. In­
stead, decision-makers have sought to find solutions 
that work for all Member States. Negotiations have 
therefore been guided by the maxim that no Member 
State should be permanently excluded from an inte­
gration project against its will. The high psychological 
resistance towards DI is also m anifest in the major 
legal hurdles placed before enhanced cooperation, as 
discussed above. In practice, until 2010 this instru­
m ent was used instead as a means to create pressure
24 Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Conceptualising a Differentiated 
Europe, Eliamep Policy Paper, 10/2008.
25 For a discussion of whether differentiated integration has
a divisive or unifying impact, see Peter-Christian Miiller-Graff,
‘“Differenzierte Integration.’ Konzept mit sprengender oder
unitarisierender Kraft für die Europäische Union?,” Integration 
30, no. 2 (2007): 129-39.
to jum pstart deadlocked negotiations. For instance, in 
the case o f the European Arrest Warrant, the option 
of using enhanced cooperation was successfully used 
against the veto o f the Italian government: when a 
credible group of Member States threatened to resort 
to enhanced cooperation, Italy gave in and agreement 
was finally reached.26
The fourth dynamic that becomes evident when 
looking at the cases in which differentiated integra­
tion has been used to date is a lowering of the afore­
mentioned threshold—a lessening in the reluctance 
to employ this instrument. This process has been 
accelerated dramatically by the European debt crises. 
The instrum ent o f enhanced cooperation, never used 
before, was utilised for the first time, in 2010-2011. 
Although the Treaty o f Lisbon has not lowered the 
legal hurdles,27 since then it has already been used 
three times. First, in 2 0 1 0 ,1 4  Member States agreed 
on a regulation for trans-European divorces in the con­
text o f enhanced cooperation.28 Due to the extensive 
cultural and legal heterogeneity w ithin the EU on this 
issue—Malta, for instance, did not even have a divorce 
law until 2011—a proposed regulation on divorce had 
failed in 2006 due to national vetoes. In contrast to 
the situation with the European Arrest W arrant, en­
hanced cooperation in this case was not merely used 
as a tactical threat but was actually implemented with 
the approval o f the Commission and the Parliament.
Even closer to the core area o f European integra­
tion—the economic integration of the single market— 
was the 2011 decision to use enhanced cooperation to 
establish an EU patent regime. For more than thirty 
years, Member States had been negotiating such a 
patent as a means of reducing the cost o f patent pro­
tection and of increasing legal unity in this area 
w ithin the internal market. Several attempts to reach 
compromise over the language rules o f the patent, 
which was the last major area under discussion, ended 
in failure due to Italy and Spain’s veto. In response, 
the remaining 25 Member States submitted an appli-
26 Eric Philippart, Optimising the Mechanism for “Enhanced 
Cooperation ” within the EU: Recommendations for the Constitutional 
Treaty. CEPS Policy Brief, May 2003, no. 33 (Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS), http://aei.pitt.edu/1978/ 
(accessed March 19, 2008).
27 In comparison to the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty of Lisbon 
only increased the minimum number of Member States from 
eight to nine, in addition to extending cooperation to include 
all aspects of the CFSP.
28 EU Council, “2010/405/: Council Decision of 12 July 2010 
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation,” (Brussels, 2010).
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cation for enhanced cooperation in 2010. Their 
application was approved in March 2011 against the 
protests o f the Italian and Spanish representatives to 
the Council.29 This brought differentiated integration 
close to the internal market, and simultaneously 
pushed two states that had until then been firmly at 
the core o f EU integration to the outside on this issue. 
In 2012, the use o f enhanced cooperation picked up 
momentum when eleven Member States made further 
use o f this instrum ent to introduce a financial trans­
actions tax, abandoning negotiations among 27 Mem­
ber States after only nine months o f official talks in 
the Council.
Above all, differentiation within the Eurozone has 
accelerated with the ongoing debt crisis that began in 
early 2010. In the wake of the crisis, the EU imple­
mented reactive policy measures in the form financial 
assistance for countries in crisis and establishing the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), but also adopted 
significant structural reforms of economic policy 
coordination in the Union—reforms that were largely 
agreed upon in advance by the Euro-17. These reforms 
include the European Semester, whereby preparation 
of national budgets and economic reforms are coordi­
nated annually, as well as the “six-pack,” six legislative 
measures that serve to strengthen the Stability and 
Growth Pact and establish procedures for monitoring 
macroeconomic imbalances. Although most o f these 
reforms primarily affect the Eurozone, they are not 
without im pact on non-Eurozone states. The existence 
o f the common market links EU countries to each 
other, so the jo in t progress of the Euro-17 in areas 
such as financial and banking regulations, the tax sys­
tem, and other aspects o f economic policy, has con­
sequences even for states that do not participate in 
the euro. For those countries that have committed 
themselves to adopting the single currency (“pre-ins”) 
but do not yet belong to Eurozone and therefore its 
institutional infrastructure, an additional problem 
arises: they have only limited input on decisions con­
cerning Eurozone governance30 yet are forced to
29 Council of the EU, Council Decision o f 10 March 2011 authoris­
ing enhanced cooperation in the area o f the creation o f a unitary 
patent (2011/167/EU) (Brussels, 2011).
30 In a formal sense, decisions on the eurozone states must 
be adopted by the entire European Union, primarily via the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN). However, 
in this case, the non-eurozone states were regularly presented 
with a package that had been largely negotiated in advance. 
Nicolai von Ondarza, ICoordinatoren an der Spitze. Politische Fuh-
watch as changes are made to the terms and condi­
tions o f the common currency that confront new 
members with higher and higher demands.
The EU is thus splitting apart increasingly into 
several distinct groups: First, there is the Euro-17, a 
group of countries that has been involved in all rescue 
and reform measures over the course o f the crisis or 
who are themselves receiving financial support. The 
second group comprises the “pre-ins” who have com­
mitted to adopt the euro. But even w ithin this group, 
there is considerable variation in the willingness to 
participate in euro crisis management and to seek 
deeper economic policy integration in the future. For 
instance, Latvia has applied to jo in  the Eurozone in 
2014, while Hungary and the Czech Republic, for 
instance, are taking a wait-and-see approach. A third 
group consists o f countries that either have a perma­
nent opt-out (United Kingdom, Denmark) or that have 
avoided legal obligations by not meeting the member­
ship criteria, as is the case with Sweden and also to an 
increasing degree with the Czech Republic.
The dramatic increase o f differentiation in the EU 
became especially apparent with the conclusion of the 
Euro Plus Pact (2011) and the Fiscal Compact (2012). 
The only countries that did not ratify the Euro-Plus 
Pact were the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary, all clearly taking a position 
outside the monetary union. Denmark, on the other 
hand, signalled its willingness to collaborate with the 
countries o f the Eurozone by signing the Fiscal Com­
pact. W hen it came to the project o f establishing fiscal 
discipline in EU primary law, the 27 Member States 
failed to reach consensus following the British veto in 
late 2011. As a result, when 17 Eurozone countries and 
eight other Member States finally signed the Fiscal 
Compact in March 2012, it became yet another DI 
project with yet another different configuration of 
states. It is noteworthy that the Fiscal Compact in­
cludes the objective o f using enhanced cooperation 
more in the future to bring about deeper economic 
integration (Article 9, Fiscal Compact).
And looking ahead, this trend of differentiation 
is certain to continue: In the immediate future, the 
planned single supervisory mechanism (SSM) as a 
cornerstone of a future banking union will be realised 
via differentiated integration. Although its exact setup 
is still to be determined, it is already clear that the
rung in den reformierten Strukturen der Europäischen Union, SWP
Research Paper 8/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, April 2011).
SWP Berlin 
Prospects and Pitfalls of a 
Strategy of Differentiated Integration 
March 2013
13
Differentiation as a reality in the integration process
SSM will initially only cover the banks o f the Eurozone 
countries, while non-Eurozone EU countries can join  
on a yet to be defined status.31 Based on current dis­
cussions, most o f the pre-ins are contemplating jo in ­
ing the SSM, while the UK government has made it 
clear that it will rem ain outside. Thus, the SSM will 
establish a new, very significant project o f DI as a 
cornerstone of European financial markets. In the 
medium term, even more differentiation is to come. 
All central elements under discussion for the deepen­
ing of EMU—an integrated financial framework, inte­
grated budgetary framework, possibly a fiscal capac­
ity for the Eurozone, an integrated economic policy 
framework, plus new measures for strengthening the 
democractic legitimacy in these areas—will only be 
agreed upon by the Euro Member States plus other 
interested EU countries, but not the whole Union.
In short, the European Union is moving swiftly 
toward a critical threshold: soon it will be impossible 
to look at differentiated integration as the exception 
to the prevailing principle o f uniformity. Instead, dif­
ferentiated integration will have to be viewed in key 
policy areas as the modus operandi o f European inte­
gration.
31 Karel Lannoo, “The Roadmap to Banking Union: A call for 
consistency,” CEPS Commentaries, 2012.
SWP Berlin
Prospects and Pitfalls of a 
Strategy of Differentiated Integration 
March 2013
14
Aw ay out of blocked negotiations
The effects of differentiated integration
In the debate over “More Europe” as a possible way out 
o f the European debt crisis, differentiated integration 
has once again moved to the focus of public debate. In 
the resulting debate there are two seemingly irrecon­
cilable camps: the proponents o f DI praise it as a strat­
egy to make progress in EU integration possible and 
bring together the most pro-integration countries.32 
The critics, on the other hand, argue that DI is a fun­
damental threat to the cohesion of the EU because it 
entails the exclusion of some Member States. Over 
the long term, they argue, this threatens to split the 
Union.33 Thus, as the reforms of EMU progress and it 
becomes clear that the EU will become more and more 
differentiated in the immediate future, it seems all the 
more urgent to empirically analyze the actual effects 
o f differentiated integration.
A way out of blocked negotiations
The primary goal o f any form of differentiated inte­
gration is to overcome political impasses. It allows a 
group of willing Member States to move forward, 
while others can remain outside—whether because 
they do not want to jo in  in, because they are not ready 
to fulfil certain criteria, or because they are obstruct­
ing decisions. In this way, differentiated integration 
can present a “soft alternative” to unanimity, making
32 See for example, Sebastian Kurpas et al., From Threat to 
Opportunity: Making Flexible Integration Work, Working Paper 
No. 15 (Brussels: European Policy Institutes Network [EPIN], 
September 2006); Kenneth Dyson and Angelos Sepos, “Dif­
ferentiation as Design Principle and as Tool in the Political 
Management of European Integration,” in Which Europe?
The Politics o f Differentiated Integration (see note 11), 3-23; Emma- 
nouilidis, Conceptualising a Differentiated Europe (see note 24).
33 Thus, still in November 2011 EU Commission President
Barroso warned against any form of differentiated integra­
tion: “Let me be clear—a split union will not work. This is 
true for a union with different parts engaged in contradictory 
objectives; a union with an integrated core but a disengaged 
periphery; a union dominated by an unhealthy balance of 
power or indeed any kind of directorium. All these are un­
sustainable and will not work in the long term.” José Manuel 
Barroso, “The State of Europe-Die Europa Rede” (Berlin, No­
vember 9, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. 
do?reference=SPEECH/ll/738 (accessed March 22, 2012).
it possible to find a compromise that is acceptable to 
everyone. This instrum ent is particularly useful in 
cases where a very small m inority is blocking agree­
m ent on an ongoing basis. In this respect, Article 20(2) 
of the TEU says that the instrum ent o f enhanced co­
operation should be used when “the objectives o f such 
cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable 
period by the Union as a whole.” Im plicit in this is 
not only the aim of allowing willing Member States to 
work more closely together, but also that o f calming 
the political situation in the EU by taking the pressure 
off non-participating Member States to justify their 
position.
The current state o f differentiated integration clear­
ly shows that this aim is a common thread that runs 
through all DI projects to date. Numerous examples 
illustrate the effectiveness o f DI as a means of over­
coming political impasses: indeed differentiated inte­
gration has often paved the way for compromises in 
treaty negotiations. In 1992, during negotiations on 
the Treaty o f Maastricht, the British government 
opposed not only the common currency but also the 
proposed agreement on social policy on political 
principle. The adoption of the agreement in the form 
of a Protocol on Social Policy, which was accepted by 
all the other eleven Member States, enabled the agree­
m ent to proceed and at the same time reduced the 
political pressure on the British government.34
However, it is not ju st differentiated integration 
within the EU system that can help to overcome im ­
passes. As with the Fiscal Compact, which aimed at 
strengthening budgetary discipline in the Eurozone— 
an objective already contained in principle in the EU 
Treaties35—it was an intergovernmental agreement in 
form of the 1985 Schengen Agreement between initial­
ly ju st five EU Member States that brought about the 
opening of internal borders and introduction of free
34 Hrbek, “Der Integrationsprozess und das Konzept ‘diffe­
renzierte Integration’” (see note 13).
35 From a legal perspective, the Fiscal Compact introduces 
little that is new. See Antonio Vitorino, “The ‘TSCG’: Much 
Ado about Nothing?,” Notre Europe: Jacques Delors Institute, 
February 23, 2012, http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_ 
publication/TSCG_ViewpointNE_Feb2012.pdf (accessed March 
22 , 2012).
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movement o f persons. This agreement was made out­
side EU structures but had been preceded by a long­
standing block by some Member States that opposed 
im plementing the EU Treaties’ provision for the free 
movement o f persons.36 The compromise o f an inter­
governmental treaty satisfied both camps: one group 
was able to open their borders to participating Mem­
ber States, while the rest o f the states were free to 
control their borders as before.
The crucial precondition for this use o f DI as a com­
promise solution is that the non-participating states 
reject the particular integration project and do not 
seek a means o f participating. If this condition is not 
met, DI can have the contrary effect and exacerbate 
political conflicts between Member States. This can 
been seen, first, when states are excluded from an in­
tegration project at the outset because o f their failure 
to comply with quality criteria. Poland has been 
particularly assertive in pushing for its inclusion in 
negotiations on reforms in the Eurozone. Although it 
had pledged in the early 2000s to jo in  the Eurozone, 
the Economic and Monetary Union has changed con­
siderably through the crisis and now makes signifi­
cantly higher demands on its members in terms of 
integration and resources. Legally bound to jo in  the 
Eurozone, Poland is left only the choice o f whether to 
accept the new “terms and conditions” o f the Euro­
zone or to violate its com m itm ent to join. As a result, 
Polish Prime Minister Tusk as well as the Swedish gov­
ernm ent have threatened not to sign the Fiscal Com­
pact as long as non-euro area states are not guaranteed 
participation in the new Euro Summits.37 In this case, 
differentiated integration does not act as a catalyst 
for overcoming political impasses but may actually be 
responsible for creating them in the first place.
Secondly, DI may have a divisive effect when the 
non-participating states are specifically excluded be­
cause the other Member States were not prepared to 
agree to their conditions. The use o f enhanced cooper­
ation to introduce an EU patent, for example, was 
intended to push Italy and Spain to relent on the lan­
guage issue. Both countries insisted that EU patents 
need to be filed not only in the three working lan­
guages o f the EU (English, German, French) but also
36 Thorsten Müller, Die Innen- und Justizpolitik der Europäischen 
Union: Eine Analyse der Integrationsentwicklung (Opladen: Leske +
Budrich, 2003), 124-29.
37 Valentina Pop, “Future EU Bail-outs Only for Treaty Signa­
tories, New Draft Says,” EU Observer, January 20, 2012.
in their native language.38 From the perspective of 
the other states in the Council and the European Par­
liam ent, however, adding to more languages would 
have raised the costs o f the EU patent so much that its 
cost advantage over existing arrangements would have 
essentially been lost. The exclusion of the two coun­
tries, however, allowed the EU patent to get underway 
and the political deadlock to be overcome. However, 
the debate became so polarised that Spain and Italy 
filed appeals before the EU Court o f Justice for an 
annulm ent o f the enhanced cooperation.39 The ques­
tion of whether DI offers a workable compromise 
solution is therefore not so much an issue o f the legal 
framework of the integration project, but rather of 
whether DI outsiders are actively excluded or stay 
away of their own accord.
Differentiation as a catalyst for 
European integration
The broader European policy vision that is linked to 
the use o f differentiated integration in the sense o f a 
“multi-speed Europe” goes beyond the goal o f simply 
overcoming short-term impasses. The vision is that DI 
can function as a catalyst for the integration all 
Member States by unleashing centripetal forces from 
the more integrated core group and thereby pulling in 
the outsiders. The long-term goal o f this process is ulti­
mately the “reunification” of all EU Member States. In 
this spirit, the Schengen Agreement not only provided 
from the outset that each Member State would be 
able to jo in  later, but further allowed for the eventual 
replacement o f its provisions by legislation of the 
European Community.40 Similarly, the Fiscal Compact 
signed in 2012 included a paragraph in Article 16 
stating that the substance o f the agreement would be 
transposed into EU Treaties w ithin five years.
38 EU Council, 2011/167/EU: Council Decision o f 10 March 2011 
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area o f the creation o f 
unitary patent protection (Brussels, 2011).
39 In their suits, both states accused the Council of violating 
the treaty provisions for enhanced cooperation, claiming that 
“the envisaged enhanced cooperation does not aim to further 
the objectives of the Union but to exclude a Member State 
from the negotiations.” EU Council, C-274/11 Case before the 
Court o f Justice o f the European Union-Kingdom o f Spain v Council 
o f the European Union (Brussels, 2011).
40 Article 140-142, Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement.
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This ‘reunification’ o f all EU Member States has 
taken place only once to date:41 in the Agreement on 
Social Policy o f the Treaty o f Maastricht, which was 
rejected by the conservative British government and 
later supported by the United Kingdom after the 
change to New Labour in 1997. The agreement was 
subsequently incorporated into EU law by the Amster­
dam Treaty.42 In other differentiated integration proj­
ects, however, reunification has not been successful.
In cases where states rejected an integration project 
for political reasons, reunification has not been 
observed—none of the other treaty opt-outs granted 
to Member States have been rescinded to date.43 Ten­
dencies towards partial integration are seen particu­
larly in DI projects from which states were initially 
excluded because they did not m eet qualitative cri­
teria. The Schengen area is one such project. It was 
gradually expanded to the m ajority o f countries that 
acceded in 2004 and 2007, five o f which have already 
adopted the euro. W ith ten countries remaining 
outside the Eurozone, the euro is still far from being 
the currency o f the entire EU.
W ith regard to the integration of international 
treaties into EU primary law, on the other hand, the 
balance sheet is more positive. The Schengen Agree­
m ent was transposed into the EU framework through 
the Amsterdam Treaty. However, this could only be 
accomplished at the price o f an opt-out for the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. The Prüm Convention, signed in 
2005,44 which provided for closer cooperation among 
an initial group of seven states in fighting cross-border 
crime, followed the same model and was able to be 
incorporated into acquis communautaire under the
German Council Presidency in 2007, albeit only at the 
cost o f including opt-outs.45
In both cases, with the transposition of agree­
ments into the acquis communautaire, the objective 
was largely fulfilled—to advance European integration 
through an avant-garde. In these cases, the rapid suc­
cession of changes in EU primary law in the 1990s and 
2000s proved beneficial.46 For example, the original 
signatories to the Schengen and Prüm agreements 
intentionally concluded these treaties either before EU 
Treaty negotiations or concurrently with them. They 
were therefore able to use the intergovernmental 
agreements developed outside EU structures as lever­
age to advance their ideas w ithin the Community.47 
Nevertheless, the transpositions were successful in 
each case only because differentiated integration was 
imported into the EU structures in addition to the 
substance o f each respective treaty: Ireland and the 
United Kingdom are still exempt from the provisions 
o f the Schengen and Prüm agreements.
W ith respect to the Fiscal Compact, mixed con­
clusions can therefore be drawn. Integration into EU 
Treaties within five years as envisaged in the agree­
m ent can only be achieved i f  it is discussed in the 
context o f larger treaty negotiations. Considering the 
difficulties encountered in the 2000s with the ratifi­
cation of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon 
Treaty, such “revisions o f the treaties” are likely only 
if, under the additional pressure o f the euro crisis, 
steps are taken toward deeper integration.48 Even 
then, however, it is to be expected that the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic will insist on 
exemptions from the rules o f the Fiscal Compact.
41 Exceptions to this of course are time-limited transitional 
provisions in areas such as the free movement of labor, which 
automatically expired after the end date.
42 The Agreement on Social Policy is still sharply criticised 
within the British Conservative Party and viewed as an area 
in which the United Kingdom is contemplating the negotia­
tion of further opt-outs.
43 Before stepping down from office, the previous Danish 
administration under Prime Minister Lars L0kke Rasmussen, 
however, publicly considered a referendum on the elimi­
nation of the Danish opt-outs. Valentina Pop, “Denmark 
Eyeing Referendum on Euro,” EU Observer, March 3, 2011, 
http://euobserver.com/843/31912 (accessed March 19, 2012).
44 See Thierry Balzacq et al., Security and the Two-Level Game:
The Treaty o f Prüm, the EU and the Management o f Threats, CEPS
Working Documents, No. 234 (Brussels: CEPS, January 2006),
http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1136 (accessed March 29,
2012).
45 Daniela Kietz, “Heimspiel in der Polizeikooperation. Span­
nungen zwischen Impulsgebung und Vermittlung,” in Hand­
lungsspielräume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft. Eine Funktionsanalyse 
des deutschen Vorsitzes im ersten Halbjahr 2007, ed. Daniela Kietz 
and Volker Perthes, SWP Research Paper 24/2007 (Berlin: Stif­
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2007), 60-67.
46 From 1986 (Single European Act) to 2007 (Treaty of Lis­
bon), EU treaty changes were agreed on average every 4.2 
years.
47 Alexander Stubb, Negotiating Differentiated Integration: 
Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002 ).
48 Lars Brozus, Daniela Kietz, and Nicolai von Ondarza, “Die 
Entwicklung des EU-Systems zwischen Reformdruck und Inte­
grationsmüdigkeit. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Pragma­
tismus,” in Entwicklungsperspektiven der EU. Herausforderungen 
für die deutsche Europapolitik, ed. Annegret Bendiek, Barbara 
Lippert and Daniela Schwarzer, SWP Research Paper 18/2011 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2011), 9-18.
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Shifting the political balance in the Union
One im pact o f the euro and debt crises is virtually 
undisputed: Germany’s influence in the EU has 
increased substantially because o f its central role in 
crisis management. Germany’s new prominence is 
generally attributed first and foremost to its current 
economic strength. Berlin acted as a major catalyst 
in the passage o f financial assistance packages for 
struggling Eurozone countries coupled with strong 
conditionality and in the agreement on reforms 
strengthening the institutional architecture o f the 
Eurozone, also by virtue of its veto power. Germany 
has been able to achieve its objectives, often working 
closely with France—for example, in the revision of 
the treaty establishing the European Stability Mecha­
nism (ESM), the design of the Fiscal Compact, and the 
rejection of euro bonds.49
The effects o f crises notwithstanding, the m echa­
nisms of differentiated integration themselves also 
shift the political balance in the Union. There are 
three primary factors at work: On a strictly m athe­
m atical level, adjustments to decision-making procedures 
affect the voting power o f individual Member States 
in the Council.50 In the case o f enhanced cooperation 
and other forms of DI initiated w ithin the EU frame­
work, the EU Treaties stipulate that voting in the 
Council must proceed in accordance with the rules 
of the qualified majority, with the same weighting of 
votes and the same percentage share o f the weighted 
votes.51 The threshold for a qualified m ajority is 
formed in relation to the quorum of 255 o f 345 votes 
necessary for a normal qualified majority, which cor­
responds to roughly 74 percent o f the vote. At first 
glance, the rules governing DI appear to uphold the 
traditional distribution of votes among the partici­
pating states: Germany and France, for example, both 
retain their 29 votes. Upon closer examination, how­
ever, the elim ination of some states, especially larger
49 William E. Paterson, “The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany 
Moves Centre Stage in the European Union,” TheJCMS Annual 
Review o f the European Union in 2010 \ 57-75.
50 Since the European Parliament has been involved in all 
forms of differentiated integration to date only as a whole, 
the distribution of seats is not changed there (see below).
51 Article 238(3) TFEU. In conjunction with the Protocol 36 
on transitional provisions, weighted voting rights as estab­
lished in the Treaty of Nice remain in force until 2014. Sub­
sequently, the same percentile will apply (55% of participat­
ing states, which represent 65% of the population of the par­
ticipating states) in cases of differentiated integration as is 
in votes with all Member States.
states, changes the relative weight o f countries, both 
in relation to each other and in comparison with the 
total number o f votes needed. This applies to the qual­
ified m ajority as well as to the blocking minority. As 
illustrated in Table 1, this im pact is even stronger 
when there are fewer Member States participating in 
a project o f differentiated integration.
The practical implications o f this shift are vividly 
illustrated by the example of the Eurozone. W hen the 
Council makes decisions that concern the monetary 
union, for example, on budgetary surveillance, only 
euro area states have a voting right pursuant to Article 
136 TFEU. The 17 Eurozone states have a total o f 213 
votes, meaning that 158 votes are necessary for a qual­
ified majority. In this case, 56 votes are sufficient for 
a blocking minority. Germany and France, which 
together have 58 votes, can therefore block any deci­
sion. This veto power increases their political weight 
in the Eurozone. Spain and Italy—the two largest of 
the states that have recently become a focus o f atten­
tion-together also have enough votes to create a 
blocking m inority o f 56 votes. The situation is differ­
ent, however, for other Euro member states that have 
been affected by the crisis: Even i f  Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal, and Cyprus pooled all o f their collective 35 
votes, this would still not be enough to form a block­
ing minority. This may further explain why these 
countries have relatively limited influence over the 
drafting of their economic assistance programmes 
in comparison with Italy and Spain.
A second im portant factor that affects how differ­
entiated integration shifts the political balance within 
the EU is the changed distribution of Member States’ 
policy preferences. It is extremely unlikely that the 
interests o f a group of Member States that is seeking 
to move forward on a policy issue coincide with the 
interests o f the entire EU. Instead, countries that share 
a common interest, in at least one area, tend to work 
more closely together. As a result, however, countries 
that are not involved may be overlooked, and m ajority 
preferences may shift significantly. The former prob­
lem is once again illustrated by EU Patent Law, in 
which the interests o f Italy and Spain could effectively 
be ignored. In cases where insiders share the m ajority 
of an outsider group’s interests—as was the case with 
the United Kingdom in the area o f justice and home 
affairs—there is substantially lower risk that their pref­
erences will be ignored.
A shift in the m ajority position w ithin the group 
o f DI insiders may also have far-reaching consequences 
for the individual states that are participating in dif-
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Table 1
Change of total votes and qualified majority in the Council of the EU in 
cases of differentiated integration
Total
votes
Qualified
majority
Blocking
minority
EU Council (total: 27) 345 255 91
EU Council (AFSJ: 24)a 302 224 77
EU Council (Eurozone: 17) 213 158 56
a These figures assume that the three opt-out states (Denmark, the UK, and Ireland) do not 
make use of their right to opt in. If they claim this right, they are once again counted among 
participating Member States, which has implications both for the total number of votes, 
as well as the number needed to make a qualified majority.
Table 2
Blocking minorities in the Council of the EU for 
decisions about the euro
Blocking minorities within the Euro-17 Required:
56 votes
German and France 58
Italy and Spain 56
Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus 35
Sources for Tables 1 and 2: Written request from February 2012 to 
the General Secretariat of the EU Council. Author’s calculations of 
blocking minorities.
ferentiated integration. As the Council’s decisions 
usually represent a compromise among the interests 
of the Member States, in the context o f DI, this may 
mean that some states lose im portant political allies. 
It may become problematic for Germany, for instance, 
if  future economic policy decisions are to be made 
increasingly w ithin the Eurozone context or as part 
o f enhanced cooperation among Eurozone countries. 
Germany will then no longer be able to form alliances 
with countries that have a highly developed culture 
of stability such as Poland and Sweden, or with others 
whose basic economic policy interests are consistent 
with its own.52
A third factor, and a question that is especially crit­
ical for states that are not participating in differen­
tiated integration, is the extent to which DI projects 
provide institutional access for outsiders. Such access 
is generally guaranteed within the EU framework: in
52 Jean Pisani-Ferry, “Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Crit­
ical Retrospective on the Debate over the Economic Gover­
nance of the Euro Area,” Journal o f Common Market Studies 44, 
no. 4(2006): 823-44.
the case o f both enhanced cooperation and opt-outs, 
non-participating Member States can at least be ob­
servers in formal negotiations. This enables them 
to obtain sufficient inform ation about the state of 
negotiations, assert their own positions, and form 
coalitions. Furthermore, in case they have an opt-in 
right, they can even vote on specific resolutions. For 
outsiders, this is a very comfortable situation. For 
example, the United Kingdom is considered to have a 
major influence in the area o f m igration and asylum 
policy, despite its opt-outs, because it plays an impor­
tant role in negotiations and participates substantially 
in a large share o f practical measures.53
If, on the other hand, this kind of passive participa­
tion is not permitted, the influence o f DI outsiders is 
reduced to a minimum. An example o f differentiated 
integration that is exclusionary, at least from the Ger­
man perspective, can be seen in the bilateral treaty 
between France and the UK on security and defence
53 Andrew Geddes, “Getting the Best of Both Worlds? Britain, 
the EU and Migration Policy,” International Affairs 81, vol. 4 
(2005): 723-40.
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policy. The two states deliberately sought to coordi­
nate their negotiations outside the EU framework and 
concluded a bilateral agreement to establish a jo in t 
expeditionary force, to cooperate on armaments proj­
ects, and to design their aircraft carriers for inter­
operability. Most importantly, their agreement intro­
duced ongoing intergovernmental consultations on 
security and defence policy and thus a process o f close 
cooperation that reached its high point to date in 
their jo in t operations in Libya in 2011 and continued 
during the French campaign in Mali in 2013. The 
British and French weight in European security has 
thus increased, while Germany’s influence has 
declined.54
Using informal forums to build bridges
A country’s political influence in the EU also crucially 
depends on its participation in diverse informal 
forums where Member States m eet to discuss current 
European policy issues. These informal bodies serve 
three main goals: first, they facilitate the exchange 
and harmonisation of positions in the context of 
EU decision-making processes (consultation function). 
Examples include the talks that take place in prepar­
ation for European Council meetings between coun­
tries such as Germany and France or between Euro­
pean party families. Second, Member States with 
shared positions regularly launch initiatives that 
feed through formal EU institutions into the respec­
tive decision-making processes (initiative function). An 
example of this was the 2011 jo in t initiative proposed 
by the W eimar states plus Italy and Spain to High 
Representative Catherine Ashton for specific projects 
designed to strengthen the CSDP.55 Informal forums 
are used, third, to coordinate national measures and 
establish jo in t policies that extend cooperation with­
in the EU framework (coordination function). This goal 
is being pursued, for instance, in the area o f justice 
and home affairs by the G6, an informal group of 
interior ministers from the six EU Member States 
with the largest population that meets to coordinate 
approaches to fighting terrorism and other key issues.
54 Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, Abkehr von der GSVP?
Französisch-britischer Bilateralismus in der Sicherheits- und Verteidi­
gungspolitik, SWP-Aktuell 81/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen­
schaft und Politik, November 2010).
55 Toby Vogel, “Sidestepping the UK over EU Military Head­
quarters?,” European Voice, September 15, 2011.
These kinds of informal groups can affect DI differ­
ently depending on how they are designed and used 
politically. On one hand, they can be used to prevent 
the emergence o f political divisions w ithin the EU.
Just as the Council allows non-participating states to 
take part as observers, inform al groups enable DI out­
siders to be involved in negotiations without having 
formal voting rights. One example of how informal 
forums have been used as a bridge is the Salzburg 
Forum, which provides eight Central and Eastern 
European states56 an opportunity for exchange and 
discussion of judicial and internal security matters. 
Founded in 2000 on the initiative o f Austria, the Salz­
burg Forum was designed to support the Central and 
Eastern European states in the ASFJ and the Schengen 
area during the transitional phase following EU en­
largement—for example, by sharing know-how or pro­
viding assistance in the im plem entation of EU legis­
lation.57 Two factors have been pivotal in the Salzburg 
Forum’s successes to date: first, it was set up from the 
outset to pursue a strategy o f gradual accession and 
was therefore closely linked to the EU framework. 
Second, the Salzburg Forum was initiated by Austria, 
which had a strong national interest—due to its posi­
tion at that time on the border o f the Schengen area— 
in bringing the participating neighbouring states into 
alignm ent with EU standards.
The G6 offers a second example demonstrating 
how inform al forums can function as a bridge for DI 
outsiders. The G6 is a group of six EU states58 that 
have been meeting since 2003 to discuss and build 
agreement around questions o f internal security 
policy. These include issues around visa, migration, 
and asylum policy as well as the fight against terror­
ism and organised crime. The G6 was conceived with 
the goal o f introducing initiatives into the EU frame­
work and formulating policy in the area o f justice 
and home affairs.59 The UK is fully involved in the G6
56 These are Bulgaria, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Croatia held an 
observer status in the Salzburg Forum up to its accession to 
the EU.
57 Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, Aus dem Innern. 
Forum Salzburg (Vienna, 2010).
58 These are Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Spain and, since 2007, Poland.
59 In a 2006 report, the House of Lords charged that the deci­
sions of the G6 preempt any involvement of other EU states 
and leave them only the choice of whether to participate in 
implementation. The report further stated that the G6 con­
siders its decisions to be made on behalf of and valid for the 
entire EU. House of Lords, Behind Closed Doors: The Meeting o f the
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process and participates even when the discussion 
deals with policy areas from which they have already 
opted out, such as the Visa Information System (VIS).60 
In comparison with other Member States that partici­
pate fully in the ASFJ, the United Kingdom even has a 
privileged role in the EU decision-making processes 
thanks to its position in the G6. Its inclusion in the 
G6 is therefore not the product o f an accession strat­
egy, as is the case with the countries in the Salzburg 
Forum, but rather the result o f political arithmetic: 
as a country with significant political influence, the 
United Kingdom has been included in the G6 not 
because o f its opt-outs, but despite them.
The new Eurozone governance architecture: 
Exclusion out of necessity?
In contrast to this, the emerging governance struc­
ture o f the Eurozone is designed to provide its mem­
ber states an exclusive forum marked by confiden­
tiality, in which the Euro-outsiders are not at the table 
for the negotiations. The primary example of this is 
the Eurogroup. It offers the 17 countries o f the Euro­
zone an inform al forum for coordination. Legally 
speaking, it has no decision-making powers61—these 
still reside with the Economic and Finance Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN).62 In actual practice, however, the 
Eurogroup is playing an ever more central role in the 
architecture o f the Eurozone and the governance of 
the EU, since it is there that all the decisions relevant 
to the Eurozone are debated and agreed upon in ad­
vance o f their formal approval by ECOFIN.63
The actual voting process in ECOFIN is therefore in­
creasingly becoming a formality. To give one example: 
in February 2012, the Eurogroup reached agreement 
on the second Greek bailout package in an hours-long 
meeting lasting late into the night. ECOFIN met the
G6 Interior Ministers at Heiligendamm. 40th Report o f Session 
2005-06. European Union Committee (London, 2006).
60 The VIS was one of the main topics of the summit in Heili­
gendamm. The United Kingdom was completely involved in 
the discussions even though it had not used its opt-in right.
61 The Eurogroup was incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon 
with Protocol 14, but it is still described as meeting “infor­
mally” (Article 1, Protocol 14 TFEU) and cannot make any 
legally binding decisions.
62 Depending on which legal framework applies, only rep­
resentatives of the euro area states are eligible to vote.
63 Uwe Puetter, The Eurogroup. How a Secretive Circle o f Finance 
Ministers Shape European Economic Governance (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2006).
day after the agreement had been reached in the 
Eurogroup and adopted the bailout decision without 
debate.64 In contrast to the situation in enhanced 
cooperation, this more informal process excludes non­
participants from the actual consultations. The same 
situation confronts even those EU Member States that 
have committed themselves to introducing the euro 
and will eventually be affected by decisions bearing on 
the Eurozone. During the debt crisis, Poland pressed 
for permission to take part in Eurogroup meetings, 
at least in its function as holder o f the Council Presi­
dency during the second h alf o f 2011—a request that 
was denied, under pressure from France in particular, 
with the argument that the group was closed as the 
Eurogroup needs confidentiality to negotiate its diffi­
cult issues.65
This situation becomes particularly problematic 
for DI outsiders when policy decisions that have been 
reached in informal DI forums in the form of package 
deals extend beyond specific DI projects and affect 
other areas. During the euro crisis, highly sensitive 
political issues such as financial assistance to indi­
vidual euro area states, the reform of economic policy 
governance in the EU, and general EU policy and 
budget policy were almost inseparably intertwined. 
Yet decisions were often formulated in the Eurozone 
structures and presented to pre-ins and permanent 
outsiders alike as faits accomplis. This was also true 
for the decision to provide Greece with additional 
funding from EU structural funds through a simpli­
fied procedure.
The problem of political spillovers resulting from 
agreements made in informal special groupings was 
exacerbated further with the institutional reforms 
adopted during the debt crisis. No treaty changes 
were made, and no new decision-making powers were 
assigned to the new bodies that would operate solely 
on behalf o f Eurozone countries. However, three deci­
sive institutional reforms were introduced in suc­
cessive stages:
First, the Euro Summit—a meeting of the heads of 
state and government o f the Eurozone states, which 
was first created as a tool for crisis management in 
2010—was transformed into a permanent body that is
64 “The Greek Crisis. The End of the Marathon?”, The Econ­
omist—Charlemagne’s Notebook (Blog), February 21, 2012, http:// 
www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/02/greek-crisis 
(accessed March 19, 2012).
65 Piotr Kaczynski, Polish Council Presidency 2011: Ambitions and 
Limitations (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies, 2011).
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set to meet at least once every six months. The Euro 
Summits should actually be held after the meeting of 
the European Council to avoid spillovers like those 
described above. Yet because o f the position of this 
body at the highest political level, it is predestined to 
make further-reaching economic policy decisions. The 
potential negative effects o f this on DI outsiders have 
been mitigated to some degree in the negotiation of 
the Fiscal Compact: led by Poland, the non-euro states 
participating in the Fiscal Compact demanded and 
were accorded the right to participate in Euro Sum­
m it meetings at least once a year.66 Over the course 
o f 2011/2012, almost all European Council meetings 
were either preceded or followed up by a Euro 
Summit.
A second reform created the office o f President of 
the Euro Summit. Like the President o f the European 
Council, this office prepares for and leads summit 
meetings. Even more significantly: not only was cur­
rent European Council President Herman Van Rom- 
puy appointed as the first President o f the European 
Summit; both positions are to be appointed concur­
rently in the future as well.67 The two positions are 
thus so closely connected that a new “double-hatted” 
position has been created, and these offices are like­
ly to be held by a single person even after the Van 
Rompuy era. For euro-outsiders, this is has a double 
significance. For one thing, the Euro Summit Presi­
dent is responsible for informing non-Eurozone states 
(and the other EU bodies) about what took place at 
the meetings and integrating these states into the EU 
consultations. At the same time, what this means de 
facto is that in the future, only candidates from Euro­
zone Member States will be eligible for the office of 
European Council President. In view of the excep­
tional political importance of this office under the Lis­
bon agreement, this significantly weakens the posi­
tion of the non-euro states w ithin the EU hierarchy.
Third, to prepare for the meetings o f the Eurogroup 
and the Euro Summit, an administrative base has been 
created to formulate decisions relevant to the Euro­
zone in form of the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG), 
a role analogous to that o f the working groups in the
66 Article 12(3) TSCG. This passage was only added after 
Poland and Sweden threatened that they would not sign 
the treaty if they were not allowed to take part in the Euro 
Summits.
67 Heads of State and Government of the Euro Area, Euro 
Summit Statement (Brussels, October 26, 2011), http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ 
125644.pdf (accessed March 19, 2012).
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hatted,” as both the Economic and Financial Commit­
tee, in which all member states prepare the ECONFIN, 
and the EWG are chaired by the same person—cur­
rently Thomas Wieser. This expansion of administra­
tive capacities has created a vertically continuous divi­
sion between the normal Council structure and the 
Eurozone bodies. Although the latter have no formal 
decision-making authority, they are the settings where 
far-reaching preliminary policy details are worked out 
between Eurozone states.
From the perspective o f non-Eurozone countries, 
this constitutes exclusion. They fear that with the 
dynamic development expected following the debt 
crisis, Eurozone members m ight gradually separate 
themselves from non-members. This may also become 
problematic for the Eurozone members themselves, 
since it not only increases the potential for divisions 
but also raises the risk o f political blockades. Even if  
the balance of political power shifts toward the Euro­
zone, the EU-27 will remain formally responsible for 
im portant questions ranging from treaty changes and 
decisions on the Stability and Growth Pact to the dis­
tribution of EU budget funds and foreign relations. 
Forced exclusion of non-euro members could lead to 
a confrontation that would significantly reduce these 
states’ willingness to cooperate and one that could 
permanently weaken the Eurozone.
At the same time, these special rules for the Euro­
zone are built upon the need for confidential and 
effective decision-making on politically and economi­
cally highly sensitive questions. A perm anent inclu­
sion of the 10 non-Eurozone states in consultations 
would significantly increase the transaction costs of 
euro area management and make negotiations more 
difficult. The single currency area undoubtedly re­
quires that the members o f the Eurogroup work 
closely together and coordinate their activities. This 
has become especially clear in the wake of the debt 
crisis. If  the Eurozone structures continue to develop 
and i f  the 17 members o f the Eurozone integrate their 
economic and budget policies further, this functional 
need will grow. The EU institutions and the Eurozone 
states must therefore succeed in striking a balance 
between the need to prevent exclusion and the need 
to allow functionally necessary differentiation.
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The challenge of maintaining the balance 
between EU institutions
Beyond its other impacts, differentiated integration 
also affects the institutional balance and political 
character o f the EU system. Decision-making proce­
dures w ithin DI projects must be adapted for Member 
States that opt out. The great challenge here lies 
finding a middle ground between allowing special 
arrangements for the various projects o f differentiated 
integration and m aintaining the institutional integ­
rity o f the EU.
In the extreme case, using international agree­
ments outside of the EU treaties usually means that 
special institutional procedures and structures have to 
be created. The Prüm Convention (2005), for instance, 
was closely linked to justice and home affairs in the 
EU. Given the initially very low number o f parties to 
the Convention68 and the high conflict potential of 
the issues it dealt with, enhanced cooperation could 
not be used and recourse to EU institutions was 
therefore not an option.69 Consequently, the conven­
tion established its own “Committee o f Ministers” 
outside o f EU structures that was empowered to adopt 
resolutions for im plem entation by unanimous vote 
(Article 43, Prüm Convention). In essence, it created a 
parallel structure to the Council o f the EU. It seems 
consistent with this logic that non-participating EU 
Member States were not invited to consultations in 
the Committee o f Ministers.
This kind of duplication of institutional structures 
can undermine the authority and legitimacy o f EU 
bodies over the long term. The rapid integration of the 
Schengen Agreement and the Prüm Convention into 
the EU legal framework prevented the emergence of 
such parallel structures. Given the hurdles that are 
likely to arise in the transposition of the Fiscal Com­
pact into EU law (see above), it is crucially im portant 
to ensure that duplicate structures do not emerge.
This seems to be safeguarded in the Fiscal Compact 
through its provisions for recourse to the EU institu­
tions: although it has the character o f an agreement 
under international law, the Fiscal Compact allows 
the European Commission to be “lent out” to the
68 With seven signatories, the number was initially below 
the quorum of eight member states that were needed at that 
time for enhanced cooperation.
69 Daniela Kietz and Andreas Maurer, Von Schengen nach Prüm.
Sogwirkungen verstärkter Kooperation und Anzeichen der Fragmen­
tierung in der EU, SWP-Aktuell 24/2006 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen­
schaft und Politik, May 2006).
signatories and for the Commission to oversee the 
agreem ent’s im plementation. In addition, when rules 
o f the Fiscal Compact have been violated, Member 
States can pursue legal action in the European Court 
o f Justice under Article 273 TFEU in connection with 
Article 7 o f the Fiscal Compact. However, the hybrid 
structure thus created—standing outside o f EU treaties 
but still integrated into the political and institutional 
system of the EU—does carry the danger o f creating 
legal uncertainties.70 The connection between debt 
brakes, which are based in national law, the Fiscal 
Compact, which is valid under international law, and 
the European legal provisions o f the strengthened 
Growth and Stability Pact may produce significant ten­
sions when contradictions arise between these three 
legal corpora—especially with the type of politically 
sensitive decisions that usually characterise national 
economic and fiscal policy.
If a DI initiative is carried out in the EU framework, 
at least the Council and the European Council can 
easily adapt institutionally. Since these are Member 
State institutions, participation and voting rights of 
the national representatives may vary from one deci­
sion-making procedure to the next. As shown above, 
for the large m ajority o f differentiated integration 
projects—with Eurozone institutions forming the im ­
portant exception—the rule is that DI outsiders are 
generally allowed to participate in consultations as 
observers without voting rights. This guarantees a 
high degree o f inclusivity and enables the decision­
making processes to be incorporated into the regular 
work of the Council.
The situation looks very different from perspective 
o f the Commission. Acting as the representative of 
the community’s jo in t interests, it has not divided its 
areas o f responsibility among DI projects so far. Deci­
sions on justice and home affairs or on the Eurozone 
are made by unanimous decision w ithin the College of 
Commissioners. Commissioners are neither legal nor 
political representatives o f their states, and have the 
same voting rights independent o f the status o f their 
respective countries o f origin. The Commission also 
plays a central role in DI projects w ithin the EU struc­
tures as the political body that guarantees the cohe-
70 For other possibilities for “lending” EU institutions to 
international agreements (Organleihe), see Daniel Thym, Un­
gleichzeitigkeit und europäisches Verfassungsrecht. Die Einbettung 
der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit, des Schengener Rechts und anderer 
Formen von Ungleichzeitigkeit in den einheitlichen rechtlichen institu­
tioneilen Rahmen der Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2004), 315ff.
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sion of the Union. Its job is to ensure that an enhanced 
cooperation project is compatible with EU law and to 
transm it inform ation between non-participating 
Member States and the European Parliament. For non­
participants in a DI, it thus constitutes the key point 
of contact, and for the participants, it guarantees the 
legitimacy o f the chosen procedure in a European 
legal context. Thus, as long as the DI is carried out in 
an EU framework, it even strengthens the Commis­
sion.
The political dilemma facing the 
European Parliament
From an institutional perspective, the expansion of 
DI projects has the most critical implications for the 
European Parliament (EP). On first sight, Parliament is 
in no way excluded from participating in the decision­
making processes on DI projects as long as these take 
place in the context o f the EU structures. This is, in 
fact, the norm: Parliament is involved in the same way 
in policy areas affected by opt-outs as it is in every 
other area: as a whole body, including the representa­
tives o f voters o f opt-out states. Similarly, when budget 
and economic policy legislation with particular rele­
vance to the Eurozone is under discussion, Parliament 
is consulted or fully involved in the decision-making 
process. The most striking example of Parliam ent’s 
full inclusion was seen in the “six-pack” of legislative 
initiatives to reform the Stability and Growth Pact.71 
Here, Parliament was able to prevail against Member 
States in achieving its far-reaching demands, and even 
managed to strengthen provisions on certain points.72
This kind of participation is only possible, however, 
w ithin the EU framework. Parliament is excluded 
from any involvement in purely intergovernmental 
agreements outside the Union. The EP was therefore 
not involved in any way in the Schengen Agreement 
before it was incorporated into EU law. The Priim Con-
71 Although the Stability and Growth Pact was aimed pri­
marily at Member States in the eurozone, it also has a limited 
effect on non-eurozone members. The legislative proposals 
of the “six-pack” were also formally adopted by the EU as a 
whole.
72 For a detailed analysis of the reforms of economic policy
governance and undertaken with the Six-Pack and the Sta­
bility and Growth Pact, see Stijn Verhelst, The Reform o f Euro­
pean Economic Governance: Towards a Sustainable Monetary Union?, 
Egmont Paper No. 47 (Gent: Academia Press for Egmont-The
Royal Institute for International Relations, June 2011).
vention also did not envision any notification of 
Parliament; the EP was merely consulted about its 
transposition into the acquis communautaire. This 
marginalisation of Parliament stood in stark contrast 
to its already significantly magnified voice in deci­
sions on justice and home affairs at the time when 
the Priim Convention was signed.
The recently approved Fiscal Compact is the first 
international legal treaty among EU Member States 
that envisions the participation of the EP. First, it 
states that the new Euro Summit President is to in­
form the EP about the outcomes of summit meetings. 
Second, the EP President gained the right to speak 
before the Euro Summit. This right is already granted 
to the EP President before the European Council, but 
up to now this had of a more symbolic character and 
has rarely led to participation in actual negotiations.73 
Parliam ent’s inclusion in the Fiscal Compact can also 
be seen as primarily symbolic, but from a longer-term 
perspective, if  the EP gains influence through other 
reforms in policy areas relevant to the Eurozone, the 
President o f the European Parliament or the heads of 
the major parliamentary groups could become im ­
portant players at the highest level.
The dilemma over the EP’s political legitimacy, 
however, only really becomes an issue when Parlia­
m ent becomes fully involved in the decision-making 
processes within EU structures. The basic concept of 
differentiated integration—that the members o f a com­
m unity are divided into participants and non-partici- 
pants—also implies an associated differentiation in the 
decision-making procedures linked to it. In the Coun­
cil, it is taken for granted that opt-out countries have 
no voting rights on decisions in areas from which they 
have withdrawn. If  applied to European Parliament, 
this would mean, for instance, that representatives 
from the United Kingdom would not be allowed to 
vote on issues pertaining to the common currency, 
and that the EP would de facto be composed differ­
ently from one issue to the next. In the past, the EP 
has rejected such fragm entation.74
The situation up to now has in fact been quite the 
opposite: in the differentiated integration projects 
carried out in the EU framework to date, Parliament 
has been involved as a whole, with all o f its represen­
tatives. This practice is questionable from the stand-
73 Philippe De Schoutheete and Helen Wallace, The European 
Council (Paris: Notre Europe, 2002).
74 Honor Mahony, “Eurozone MEPs Should Have Exclusive 
Voting Rights, French Deputy Says,” EU Observer, October 18, 
2011, http://euobserver.com/19/113972 (accessed July 5, 2012).
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point o f democratic legitimacy, since it gives parlia­
mentary representatives a voice even in decisions 
that do not actually affect their constituencies. These 
representatives could therefore change the decisions 
o f the European Parliament with their votes. Two 
examples vividly illustrate this problem. W hen the 
EP votes on questions regarding the monetary union, 
such as the resolution on the euro crisis, there are 
currently 273 representatives (36.2% of the plenum) 
that have a right to vote even though their Member 
States have not adopted the euro.75 In the case o f one 
parliamentary group, the “European Conservatives 
and Reformists,” more than 95 percent o f the repre­
sentatives are from non-euro states. It can therefore 
be assumed that the participation of parliamentary 
representatives from non-euro states is influencing the 
results o f voting on questions o f common currency.
If the trend toward more differentiated integration 
continues, the EP will certainly claim a role in deci­
sion-making that is commensurate with its position 
as the sole EU body vested with direct democratic 
legitimacy. Parliamentary representatives would then 
also have to face the quandary o f political legitimacy. 
There does not seem to be any easy way out: the EP 
rejects the idea of splitting Parliament into one full 
parliam ent and sub-parliaments for individual DI 
projects, arguing that this would reduce its trans­
parency and run counter to its fundamental principle 
and self-conception—the idea that parliamentary 
representatives represent the citizens o f the union as 
a whole. On the other hand, votes in which more than 
one-third o f all ballots cast are from representatives 
o f unaffected populations are o f dubious democratic 
legitimacy. By m aintaining a full parliament without 
differentiation, the EU could weaken its influence in 
negotiations over the future structure o f economic 
policy governance and risk ending up on the losing 
end of the DI process.
Excluded from the central positions? 
Differentiation and staffing decisions
One area where the exclusion or inclusion o f Dl-out- 
siders takes effect is the staffing decisions in the EU 
institutions. Here, the extent to which personnel from 
non-participating member states are excluded from 
powerful positions varies widely. The EP claims to be 
a pan-European institution representing all o f the
75 Author’s calculation.
Union’s citizens. In its committees, however, one can 
clearly see a limited form of differentiation by country 
o f origin among the Members o f European Parliament 
(MEPs). Looking at the two committees responsible 
for the ASFJ, for example, two different effects can be 
seen. On the one hand, the percentage o f MEPs from 
the UK is only slightly lower than the percentage from 
DI insider countries like Germany.76 On the other 
hand, there have been no Danish or Irish MEPs on 
either committee in either o f the legislative periods.77
This trend can also be seen in the pre-decisional 
phase of legislation. In the work o f Parliament, the 
most im portant role is played by the rapporteurs 
responsible for a particular dossier. For instance, 
rapporteurs conduct the crucial negotiations in tria- 
logues with the Council and the Commission. Looking 
at the rapporteurs in the current legislature, it be­
comes clear that MEPs from a Member State not par­
ticipating in a DI project are almost never named 
rapporteurs for the respective dossier. For instance, 
over the last two legislative periods, no Danish MEP 
has been appointed rapporteur on questions of 
CSDP.78 Similarly, with ju st two exceptions,79 all 
rapporteurs on issues directly related to the common 
currency have been from states that have already 
introduced the euro. This pattern can also be seen 
in matters o f justice and home affairs. During the 
last two legislative periods, no MEPs from Denmark 
or Ireland were rapporteurs to the ASFJ. The strong 
influence o f the British MEPs, on the other hand, 
appears to override this process o f “natural selection”:
76 For example, the German MEPs’ share of seats on the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) over the last two legislative periods was 10.5% (EP as 
a whole: 13.05%), the British MEPs’ share was 7.8% (EP as a 
whole: 9.85%). Author’s calculations based on official infor­
mation from the European Parliament.
77 Only in the 2004-2009 legislative period was there a 
Danish representative in the LIBE Committee, otherwise 
there were neither Irish nor Danish representatives on this 
or in the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI).
78 Own survey based on official information from the Euro­
pean Parliament on the 2004-2009 and 2009-2012 legis­
lative periods .See European Parliament, Legislative Observatory, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/home/home.do?lang=en 
(accessed February 3, 2012).
79 The exceptions were a report by Bulgarian representative 
Slavi Binev on fighting euro counterfeiting and a report by 
UK representative Vicky Ford on the reform of the stability 
and growth pact (ibid.).
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36 of a total o f 170 dossiers in the ASFJ had British 
MEPs as rapporteurs.80
Regarding the leadership o f the EP, DI projects have 
had very little effect on appointments to positions 
such as President or Vice-President o f the European 
Parliament. This is evident from the election of Jerzy 
Buzek, who comes from the non-Eurozone country of 
Poland, as President. Of the 14 Vice-Presidents o f the 
EP, in the last two legislatures continuously at least 
four came from non-members o f the Eurozone or 
from states that are not part o f the ASFJ. Here, too, 
the United Kingdom played a prom inent role as at 
least one member of the Bureau was always a British 
MEP, a feat not achieved by French MEPs.81
A different picture emerges for the European Com­
mission. At the level o f the normal Commission offi­
cials, participation or non-participation in a DI project 
has little effect. Relative to the total staff o f the Com­
mission, British, Danish, and Irish officials have only 
slightly lower representation in the Directorates-Gen- 
erals dealing with ASFJ82 than in the others. Appoint­
ments to top decision-making posts, however, are 
guided by a very clear philosophy. Since the EU Mem­
ber States began using the instrum ent o f opt-outs on 
matters o f common currency, ASFJ, and the Schengen 
area, none of the responsible Commissioner posts has 
been filled with an official from a non-participating 
state.83 Furthermore, during this time, only politicians 
from countries participating in all DI projects—at pres­
ent only 10 out o f 27 states (see overview in Annex, 
p. 34)—have been elected Commission President. At 
least in the public debate, it has been emphasised that 
a Commission President should be in a position to rep­
resent the interests o f the most im portant DI projects 
outside the EU.
In the Council o f the EU and in the European Coun­
cil, this kind of differentiation takes place autom ati­
cally: the decision-making bodies are comprised of 
representatives o f the Member States, and depending
80 Own survey. Under examination were only the two com­
mittees dealing directly with questions of the AFSJ : LIBE and 
JURI.
81 Author’s calculations based on official information from 
the European Parliament.
82 These are the Directorates-General for Justice (JUST) and 
Home Affairs (HOME). In March 2012 there were staff mem­
bers from all three opt-out states represented in both Direc- 
torates-General. European Commission, Distribution o f Officials 
and Temporary Agents by Directorate General and Nationality (All 
Budgets), August 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/ 
europa_sp2_bs_nat_x_dg_en.pdf (accessed August 25, 2012).
83 Own survey based on official information from the EU.
on the rules o f the DI project in question, non­
participants either do not participate at all or par­
ticipate without voting rights (see above). The Council 
Presidency, on the other hand, is assigned according 
to a strict rotation principle, such that DI outsiders 
may hold the presidency in Council configurations 
that deal, for instance, with questions o f ASFJ. Under 
the Treaty o f Lisbon, the question arises how DI could 
and should affect appointments to the two leadership 
positions in the Council system—the Permanent Presi­
dent o f the European Council and the High Represen­
tative for Foreign and Security Policy.84 Analogous to 
the situation in the Commission, it is unlikely that a 
Danish candidate, for example, would be seriously 
considered for the office o f High Representative in 
light o f this position’s responsibility for CSDP. More 
striking are the consequences for the office o f Per­
m anent President o f the European Council, who, as 
described above, now wears the “double h at” o f Presi­
dent o f European Council and President o f the Euro 
Summit. Thus, it can be assumed that only candidates 
from Eurozone states will be appointed to this office 
in the future.
In sum, three conclusions can be drawn about dif­
ferentiated integration from surveying the current 
staffing policies in the EU institutions: first, at least 
in the supranational institutions, non-participating 
states are involved on the administrative and oper­
ative level, but this pattern only extends as far as top 
leadership positions in the case o f the European Par­
liament. Second, the United Kingdom occupies a 
special position: despite its large number o f opt-outs, 
it is represented as well as, or better than, states that 
are participating but smaller. Third, the ongoing DI 
in the Eurozone ultim ately intensifies differentiation 
in a manner that seems likely to increasingly exclude 
candidates from non-participating states, a trend that 
is reinforced in appointments to top leadership posi­
tions in the Commission and Council structure.
Solidarity and cohesion in the Union
From a European perspective, differentiated integra­
tion should be examined critically not least o f all in 
relation to its effects on solidarity and cohesion in 
the Union. The principle o f differentiation in itself is 
potentially dangerous for a political community. After
84 On the reformed leadership structures in the EU see von
Ondarza, ICoordinatoren an der Spitze (see note 30).
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all, a “sense o f community”—which Max Weber viewed 
as essential for the acceptance o f m ajority decisions 
and the formation of a common identity—only comes 
about in the process o f working together to overcome 
shared challenges. Yet to a certain degree, DI prevents 
EU Member States from having this experience. If  only 
the DI participants face shared challenges while the 
non-participating states are shielded from both posi­
tive and negative effects, it is impossible for a sense of 
community to arise. Three problematic constellations 
have had acutely negative effects on the Union’s co­
hesion in the past:
First among them is the perception of a “two-class 
EU,” which is closely connected to DI areas in which 
an integrated core group has actively excluded others. 
This was true o f the numerous transitional arrange­
ments that were used by the then 15 EU Member 
States to shield themselves from the potentially nega­
tive impacts o f enlargement. Although the large 
m ajority o f transitional arrangements in the enlarge­
m ent rounds of 2004 and 2007 were o f a technical 
nature, they were severely criticised in the affected 
societies—for example, because transitional arrange­
ments on the free movement o f workers disadvan­
taged their citizens.85 In contrast to such processes 
o f active exclusion, voluntarily chosen outsider posi­
tions, such as those taken by the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and Denmark with their opt-outs, may have 
little effect on the cohesion of the Union. Whereas 
these three EU Members only participate in parts of 
the ASFJ, they do not consider this to be exclusion 
but rather confirm ation of their own sovereignty.86
Second, voluntary opt-outs can undermine cohesion 
and solidarity in the EU when the outsiders are pro­
tected from shared risks and threats by their non­
participation or are only indirectly affected. When 
migration to the southern borders o f the EU increased 
following the political upheavals in the Arab world in 
2011, only the member states in the Schengen Agree­
m ent were directly affected. This naturally gave rise 
to different perceptions o f the problem w ithin the EU: 
the Schengen states engaged in heated negotiations 
among themselves over how to deal with migration
85 Christina J. Schneider, “Differenzierte Mitgliedschaft und 
die EU-Osterweiterung. Das Beispiel der Arbeitnehmerfreizu- 
gigkeit,” Swiss Political Science Review 12, vol. 2 (2006): 67-94.
86 Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen,
“Straitjacket or Sovereignty Shield? The Danish Opt-out on
Justice and Home Affairs and Prospects after the Treaty of
Lisbon,” Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, (2010): 137-61.
and whether to re-introduce border controls for a 
limited period of tim e.87
At its core, this political debate revolved around 
solidarity over questions o f asylum policy and migra­
tion among the members o f the Schengen Agreement. 
Their solidarity was put to a severe test by the in­
creasing pressure o f migration. Commentators in the 
leading European news media interpreted the Franco- 
Italian conflict over the opening of Italian borders to 
allow refugees to continue on into France as evidence 
o f a continued deterioration of trust in the EU. Ob­
servers also saw the temporary réintroduction of bor­
der controls by Denmark as an expression of creeping 
renationalisation and an assault on the European sym­
bol o f open borders.88 Nevertheless, the jo in t com m it­
m ent to the Schengen Agreement forced the parties 
to seek a European solution. Under pressure from the 
other Schengen states and the EU Commission, the 
basic provisions o f the agreement were reformed and 
the competencies o f the border security agency Fron­
tex were expanded.89 But the non-Schengen states 
escaped the pressure to find a jo in t solution. In short: 
whereas the conflicts between France and Italy raised 
doubts about the mutual solidarity between them, 
the opt-out states distanced themselves from this soli­
darity from the outset.
Third, a high level o f DI may erode the already nar­
row foundation for European identity, especially when 
heavily symbolic areas are affected. As a key elem ent 
o f European identity, the EU Treaty envisions EU citi­
zenship in addition to national citizenship (Article 20 
TFEU). The Treaty also confers specific rights on the 
citizens o f the EU, including free movement within 
the Union, active and passive voting rights in elections 
to the European Parliament, and the right to consular 
protection (Article 20(2) TFEU). Nonetheless under opt- 
out arrangements, EU citizens o f specific Member 
States such as the United Kingdom and Poland are not 
fully protected by the European Union’s Charter o f 
Fundamental Rights—a document that was aimed to 
have a formative character analogously to the US Bill 
o f Rights or Articles 1-20  o f the German Basic Law. In
87 Sergio Carrera et al., A Race against Solidarity. The Schengen 
Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair, CEPS Papers in Liberty and 
Security (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, April 
2011), http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/5512 (accessed 
March 19, 2012).
88 See, e.g., Peter Spiegel, “European Integration Is Unravel­
ing,” Financial Times, May 30, 2011.
89 European Council on June 23/24, 2011, Conclusions (Brus­
sels, 2011).
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the face o f such fragmentation, the aim of forging a 
common identity based on shared rights is destined 
to failure.
The three aforementioned patterns appeared most 
clearly—and in mutually reinforcing, negative com­
bination—during the debt crisis, when, for the first 
time in the history o f the EU, the political debate over 
the core design and future o f the Union focused on a 
project o f differentiated integration. W ith the rapid 
series o f crisis meetings held by Eurozone members, 
an active process o f exclusion unfolded that was 
further exacerbated by reforms within the monetary 
union. As demonstrated above, the increasing insti­
tutional em ancipation of the Eurozone states in the 
context o f the Euro Summits is politically extremely 
dangerous, especially for the pre-ins. They are required 
to support the decisions made in the Eurozone frame­
work with a view to their long-term prospects, but are 
excluded from the consultations among Eurozone 
states, heightening their fears o f becoming “second- 
class members.”
Second, the solidarity between Eurozone mem­
bers and non-members was put to a severe test by the 
high (financial) costs and risks o f the assistance pro­
grammes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Only the Eurozone member states committed support 
to Greece, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), and the ESM. Yet non-Eurozone members such 
as Sweden and Denmark also contributed funds to 
specific EFSF programs.90 There was particularly in­
tense public discussion in the United Kingdom, which 
is itself deeply in debt, about whether to contribute to 
the assistance measures for Eurozone states that have 
run into balance-of-payments problems. The British 
government, with the agreement o f Parliam ent,91 ulti­
mately decided to contribute bailout funds for Ireland 
out o f a national interest, but refused to contribute to 
the other aid packages. At the same time, the distinc­
tion between Eurozone members and non-Eurozone 
members also affected the willingness o f individual 
Member States to show solidarity with potential recip­
ient countries. Thus, while the Eurozone states pro­
vided support to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal and the 
European Central Bank bought large quantities of 
Italian and Spanish government bonds on the second­
90 For a precise list of the states participating in the indi­
vidual EFSF programs, see EFSF, The European Financial Stability 
Facility, 2012, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_ 
en.pdf (accessed March 19, 2012).
91 Flouse of Commons, Hansard. Loans to Ireland Bill, December 
15, 2010, vol. 520, part no. 91, 2010.
ary market, they provided no similar financial aid to 
non-Eurozone countries like Hungary and Latvia that 
were also facing debt problems. No m atter how these 
rescue packages are evaluated politically and economi­
cally, this example shows how differentiated integra­
tion has created new dividing lines within Europe.
Not least o f all, the common currency is an ex­
tremely powerful symbol o f shared political identity, 
in both a positive and a negative sense, and one in 
which the non-euro states have no part. This is both 
true for the positive aspects o f the euro’s symbolic 
power as a sign of European unity—with coins bear­
ing images from all 17 Eurozone states passing daily 
through the hands o f EU citizens who have come to 
take the existence of the euro for granted. In the UK, 
on the other hand, the retention of the pound is cele­
brated as an emblem of national sovereignty and of 
the island’s independence from the continent. Taken 
together, the rising differentiation surrounding Euro­
zone governance threatens to weaken cohesion and 
solidarity o f the EU-27 over the long term.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
There are three key insights that can be drawn from 
this analysis o f the practice of differentiated integra­
tion and its consequences so far. Firstly, those who 
warn of the emergence o f a “two-speed Europe” are 
adhering to a myth of European unity that has long 
since been left behind by the political realities o f the 
EU. W ith projects like the common currency and the 
Schengen area, with the numerous opt-outs and the 
instrum ent o f enhanced cooperation, the EU Member 
States are already well on their way down the path of 
differentiated integration. A fairly stable core group 
of 20 Member States participate in most o f the DI 
projects, while the DI outsiders—with the UK at the 
forefront—vary from one policy area to the next. Some 
of the outsiders have emphasised that they do not 
intend to jo in  the core integration group in the long 
term. The evolution of differentiated integration is 
following the model o f a “core Europe,” and the differ­
entiation currently taking place is o f a permanent 
nature.
Secondly, despite the increasing fragmentation 
of the community amidst a growing number of DI 
projects, the EU has succeeded so far in lim iting the 
negative effects o f differentiation. This is partly due 
to the common institutional framework o f the EU has 
allowed DI outsiders to stay informed about the nego­
tiations and decisions on the different projects and 
in most cases to participate as observers. States that 
could not jo in  the common currency or Schengen area 
because they did not m eet qualitative requirements 
were provided with an accession strategy that is facil­
itating their transitional phases. Opt-in rights have 
also been accorded to some of the states that chose to 
opt out o f certain areas. Furthermore, differentiated 
integration was designed in a permeable way so that 
non-participants can always opt in at a later point in 
time.
Thirdly, differentiated integration has reached a 
new level in the framework of the European debt 
crisis, and this will permanently affect the govern­
ance, the balance o f power, and cohesion in the EU. 
The impacts o f differentiated integration presented 
here do not ju st pile up but rather increase exponen­
tially, in particular the negative effects: instruments 
like the Euro Plus Pact, the Fiscal Compact, the
planned use o f enhanced cooperation for a financial 
transaction tax or the upcoming single supervisory 
mechanism for banks do offer ways out o f gridlock, 
but at the same time, the EU is splitting up into more 
and more different groupings with 1 1 ,1 7 , 23, 25, or 
other numbers o f members. Most o f the new construc­
tions are intergovernmental in nature. As a result, 
supranational EU institutions, first and foremost the 
European Parliament, are being marginalised, while 
the balance of power is shifting toward the large 
Member States. Moreover, a group of outsider states is 
gradually emerging, with the UK at the fore, that are 
distancing themselves so far from the core o f the EU 
that they can scarcely be considered full members.
The answer to this challenge cannot be to adhere 
blindly to the principle o f uniformity in integration— 
the EU is already too far down the path of differenti­
ated integration. W ithin the current constellation of 
interests, such an approach would manoeuver it into 
in an almost inextricable impasse with highly explo­
sive potential. Full participation of all 27 EU Members 
in all crisis management measures is neither desirable 
from the viewpoint o f the Eurozone states, nor would 
states like the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, or 
even Sweden be persuaded to assign wide-ranging new 
competencies in economic, fiscal, and budget policy 
to the EU level. In contrast, the efforts o f the UK for 
new opt-outs have made it clear that the movement 
towards differentiation will continue. If EMU and 
the surrounding policy areas are to be deepened, an 
expansion of differentiated integration will neces­
sarily be the method of choice.
Two strategies for a differentiated Union
Against this backdrop, the EU and its Member States 
will have to tackle the question o f how to shape the 
European integration process in the future in order to 
accommodate such a high proportion of DI projects. 
Here, policy makers face two very different options 
with fundamentally divergent effects.
The first possible approach would be to strive for a 
flexible Union in which DI is used as an instrum ent to 
adapt differentiation projects to the needs o f the Mem-
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ber States that want to participate. This strategy is 
based on the idea of the EU as a toolbox that Member 
States can draw from depending on their policy pref­
erences. For Germany—the driving force behind the 
reform of the Eurozone and a participant in all DI 
projects to date—such a strategy could be beneficial 
particularly in the area of economic and monetary 
policy, where it could help to build a stable, com­
petitive network of pro-reform countries around the 
monetary union.
The key feature o f this strategy is its flexibility.
As shown above, EU treaties and intergovernmental 
treaties offer the Member States a wealth o f possi­
bilities for organizing flexible cooperation. From a 
pragmatic political standpoint, states could use 
the legal framework that best serves their particu­
lar political goals in the multilevel EU system. The 
Union’s toolbox is already extremely well stocked: 
if  the aim is simply to coordinate national policies 
without transferring further competencies to the EU 
level, the option of using intergovernmental treaties 
is the right instrum ent, as exemplified by the Fiscal 
Compact. However, i f  the aim is to expand the EU’s 
authority to enforce measures at the national level— 
for example, in the area o f economic policy—a normal 
or simplified treaty revision procedure can be used 
that includes the possibility o f opt-outs. For DI projects 
with close proximity to existing EU competencies, en­
hanced cooperation can be used.
The same flexibility could also be extended to the 
array o f Member States that work together only when 
they are interested in closer cooperation or integra­
tion in a specific area. In the CSDP, for example, 
between 6 and 27 states participate in different oper­
ations, although no single EU state has been involved 
in all CSDP operations to date. According to the same 
principles, different core groups o f DI projects could 
be established in a given policy area—in economic 
and monetary policy, the Eurozone would be the inte­
grated core; in justice and home affairs it would be 
the Schengen area, and in security and defence policy, 
there would be a defence core that still remains to be 
created.
The second defining feature o f this strategy is that, 
in consequence, the EU would be used primarily as an 
organisational framework in which the Member States 
rem ain the key actors that determine their own level 
of integration. The formal instrum ent o f enhanced co­
operation can only be implemented to a very limited 
degree in this manner as it greatly limits flexibility.
For all other tools, however, it is the Member States—
in particular the heads of state and government—that 
operate the levers o f power to create new DI initia­
tives. Intergovernmental instruments offer a maxi­
mum of flexibility in the range of areas covered and 
in the options for national governments to tailor deci­
sion-making procedures to their interests. As demon­
strated, however, the employment o f these differentia­
tion tools comes at greater costs to the coherence and 
the integrity o f the EU.
The opposite strategy is to create a centre o f  gravity 
w ithin the EU structures. Here a core o f strongly pro­
integration Member States would work more closely 
together and provide an impetus for close cooperation 
in the further development o f the Union. The first 
m ajor difference between this and the previous strat­
egy is that here, all DI projects would be anchored in 
the common organisational and legal framework of 
the European Union. Such a voluntary limitation would 
initially preclude intergovernmental approaches like 
those used to conclude the Schengen Agreement, the 
Prüm Convention, or the more recent Fiscal Com­
pact, and would only include enhanced cooperation, 
PESCO, and the opt-outs and transitional provisions 
that are based in the EU treaties. As a result o f this 
lim itation, the provisions on differentiated integra­
tion anchored in EU law need to be adhered to, which 
would mean: no expansion of competencies without 
the agreement o f all EU Member States. Here, the guid­
ing principle should be consistency with all other EU 
policies, and the unified institutional framework of 
the EU should be utilised to the fullest. In addition, DI 
projects organised in the Union would be linked in a 
legally and politically appropriate m anner to existing 
EU principles, the established EU procedures, and 
with other policy areas in order to guarantee that EU 
integrity is safeguarded and to exploit potential syn­
ergies.
The creation of a centre o f gravity within the EU 
structures implies, secondly, that DI projects should 
be designed from the start around the model o f a 
“two-speed” Europe that will allow all Member States 
to eventually participate. This can only be realised 
through a high level o f permeability. For this, DI proj­
ects should fulfil three criteria: First, they should 
always accord DI outsiders the possibility o f later 
accession, which may be conditioned on the fulfil­
m ent o f qualitative criteria. Second, the EU institu­
tions should involve DI outsiders structurally in the 
decision-making processes o f the particular DI proj­
ects by allowing them to participate in consultations 
without voting rights as they are in the Council in
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all policy fields except EMU, and by including both the 
European Parliament and the Commission. This would 
prevent the emergence o f new lines o f division and 
would greatly facilitate later entry to projects. Finally 
and not least in importance, projects that initially ex­
clude states based on qualitative criteria should con­
tain accession strategies from the outset that gradual­
ly prepare DI outsiders for later participation. These 
could include financial aid as well as the transfer of 
practical know-how—for example, in the form of jo in t 
training programs or the exchange of experts.
Third, a centre o f gravity can only take full effect 
when it includes incentives for DI outsiders to even­
tually participate in all areas. DI projects should there­
fore be designed to provide their benefits only to those 
states that are willing to participate fully. Some of 
the existing instruments o f differentiated integration 
violate this principle: opt-ins by the UK, Ireland, and 
Denmark include the possibility to participate in 
decisions that are advantageous to them  and allow 
them  to refrain from the rest. Opt-ins increase per­
meability, but not only do they reduce the transpar­
ency o f the EU, they also take away any incentive to 
ever participate fully in ASFJ or Schengen. Positive 
incentives for participation should therefore be 
created in justice and home affairs—for instance, by 
granting access to jo in t instruments such as Europol 
and Frontex only to insiders. For the EMU, such in­
centives could take the shape of full access to the ESM 
and in the longer term also support mechanisms in 
the Eurozone for countries facing asymmetric shocks.
The use o f differentiated integration exclusively 
w ithin the EU framework would also alleviate some 
o f the deficits in democratic legitimacy that have 
appeared in the process o f dramatic expansion in the 
use o f differentiated integration. The democratic 
deficits o f the EU have been exacerbated by the use of 
differentiated integration outside the EU framework. 
Intergovernmental treaties like the Fiscal Compact, 
for example, push the EP to the margins. And when 
political decisions are brokered primarily by national 
governments behind closed doors, national parlia­
ments are reduced to the role o f rubber-stamp insti­
tutions that simulate legitimacy without being able 
to exercise any actual influence. The EU framework, 
however, contains a series o f protective mechanisms 
that can guarantee a minimum of democratic legiti­
macy: these include the full involvement o f the EP 
in the use o f enhanced cooperation. Furthermore, 
national parliaments such as the German Bundestag 
also have fought to gain comprehensive rights of
information, monitoring, and co-decision in EU 
matters, which would then become applicable. The 
organisation of differentiated integration w ithin the 
EU framework would mean an increase in democratic 
legitimacy and transparency in the European Union.
Designing differentiated integration to 
strengthen the EU
W hen comparing the path o f differentiated integra­
tion taken in recent years with the two strategies dis­
cussed here—the state-centred toolbox and the EU- 
focused centre o f gravity—it becomes clear that the 
m ajority o f Member States have decided in favour 
of the first option. W ith the exception of Permanent 
Structured Cooperation, all conceivable forms of 
differentiated integration have now been used inten­
sively. The most recent DI projects have used primarily 
intergovernmental forms of cooperation with limited 
involvement o f EU institutions and have also created 
new formal and informal institutions.
As the EU is moving towards deepening EMU, the 
architects o f the coming reforms must now grapple 
with the consequences o f the path that differentiated 
integration has taken so far. The first step should be 
to recognise differentiated integration as the primary 
method o f  integration under the given constellation of 
interests in the EU and to discuss its advantages and 
disadvantages openly. For too long, the European 
policy debate has been replete with normative, gener­
alised warnings o f “impending division” and “second- 
class m embership.” Yet member states choose to 
expand differentiated integration with each treaty 
amendment. W hat is needed now is to engage deci­
sively with this differentiation in order to move for­
ward with as many Member States as possible, and to 
develop useful political concepts for this engagement.
As part o f the reform efforts, the EU therefore needs 
a coherent design for the ongoing process o f differen­
tiated integration to prevent its disintegration into 
separate groups. To this end, in particular the German 
government should press for m aximal permeability of 
the existing differentiated integration projects. As 
shown above, the new Eurozone institutions stand 
out as negative examples. In contrast to opt-outs and 
enhanced cooperation, they offer no rights o f partici­
pation for DI outsiders. Participation without voting 
rights would help prevent the emergence of new 
dividing lines and would reduce tendencies towards 
decoupling from the EU, and would not place a pro-
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hibitive burden on decision-making. The costs o f the 
increased coordination efforts would be at least partly 
mitigated by the use o f established EU structures, the 
increased ease o f integrating new Member States at 
a later point in time, and the prevention of potential 
impasses that can result from tendencies to break 
away from the rest o f the group. Concerted efforts 
should be made to integrate those states that have 
already made a legal and political com m itm ent to 
jo in  the euro.
For this, the principle o f using the EU framework 
as the primary strategy for the further developing 
differentiated integration should be adopted formally 
and communicated publicly. This would mean a limi­
tation to enhanced cooperation under fixed treaty pro­
visions, with possible opt-outs in the case o f expanded 
competencies or changes in primary legislation. Such 
a clearly communicated lim itation would, however, 
have numerous advantages: the EU institutions would 
be fully involved and the coherent framework o f the 
Union would be maintained, and transparency would 
also be created for non-participating partners. In 
addition, this could be expected to have fewer nega­
tive effects on transparency and democratic legiti­
macy, at least compared to an intergovernmental 
form of differentiated integration.
Finally, but not least important, the EU needs a 
long-term strategy o f  consolidation to bring the various 
forms of differentiated integration back together.
After the recent expansion of differentiated integra­
tion into a wide array o f formats in crisis management 
mode, the Euro-17, pre-ins, and the permanent out­
siders should work together to bring the provisions 
of the Fiscal Compact and the Euro-Plus Pact back into 
the EU framework, as the EU did before in the case of 
the Schengen Agreement and the Priim Convention. 
This will only be possible through extensive changes 
to the EU treaties and substantial compromises with 
states outside the Eurozone—the United Kingdom in 
particular. At the same time, the German government 
as primary driver o f the reforms should follow the 
example of the Salzburg Group and reach out to those 
Central and Eastern European countries that are inter­
ested in accession to the euro and gradually integrate 
them into the new euro system. This should make it 
possible to stop the disintegration of the Union and 
move toward a centre o f gravity in the EU that offers 
its members the flexibility they need and also em­
powers them with the capacity to act effectively 
together.
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Acronyms
Appendix
Acronyms
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
DI Differentiated Integration
EC Enhanced Cooperation
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
EP European Parliament
ESM European Stability Mechanism 
G6 Group of 6 (Interior ministers of the six largest EU
Member States: Germany, France, UK, Italy, Poland, 
Spain)
JURI Committee of the EP for Legal Affairs 
LIBE Committee of the EP for Civil Rights, Justice, and 
Home Affairs 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation 
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
VIS Visa Information System
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Overview
Participation of EU Member States in projects of differentiated integration
Projects AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT IT LU LV MT NL PL FT RO SE SI SK Total
Eurozone 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 17
Euro Plus Pact 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 23
Fiscal Pact 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25
CSDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 26
Schengen Agreement3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25
Charta of
Fundamental Rights 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 24
AFSjh 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24
EU Patent 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 25
Trans European 
Divorce Law
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 14
Total 9 9 8 8 4 9 6 8 8 8 9 2 8 7 6 9 8 9 9 9 8 6 9 8 6 9 8
a Bulgaria, Romania, and Cyprus ratified the Schengen Agreement, but it has not entered fully into force, 
b Opt-outs with an opt-in possibility are treated in this table as non-participation.
Source: author’s compilation.
Country abbreviations
AT Austria CZ Czech Republic ES Spain GR Greece LT Lithuania NL Netherlands SE Sweden
BE Belgium DE Germany FI Finland HU Hungary LU Luxemburg PL Poland SI Slovenia
BG Bulgaria DK Denmark FR France IE Ireland LV Latvia PT Portugal SK Slovakia
CY Cyprus EE Estonia GB Great Britain H Italy MT Malta RO Romania
A
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